This is a good take. Also hints at why Peter Thiel's thesis on tech monopolies in a dynamic world is correct; i.e. that they aren't necessarily bad. A lot of the value in big tech comes from scale and integration and is inherently not sensible to have a thousand mom and pop shops do it and keep the same value. To the extent that Google is doing anything nefarious as a monopoly with integration, any other company who is willing to value Chrome at any significant price is inevitably going to need a scaled product to tie this to and accomplish what Google did with Chrome. They cannot pull this off on their own even though the open-source Chromium exists, because Google is actually better than them at maintaining a browser ecosystem. I am certain they will do a worse job at owning Chrome, especially considering Google has shown a good faith effort in shipping a browser and keeping the engine open source.
Ironically, this whole saga is happening at the same time the "Google search business is under attack" is at its peak in the news media.
Thiel speaks from the perspective of the monopolist, pithily condensed to 'competition is for losers'. Any product involves a set of trade-offs, and decisions. It is not a law of nature that the monopoly product makes trade-offs everyone, or even anyone, is happy with: people could identify ways the product could be improved. But under a monopoly they can't vote with their wallets. Consider Microsoft in the 80s and 90s. They were, realistically speaking, the only game in town. What efficiency did their monopoly help achieve, and why did it justify the stifling of choice? Maximizing efficiency is a more tenable argument when the product is undifferentiated, which is not the case in technology.
The point is precisely that being super fixated on Microsoft as a monopoly producing relatively trash-quality products is a static worldview. It is the case that Microsoft monopoly did not in any shape or form preclude a measly search startup and a beleaguered Cupertino company from surpassing it to the slightest (mind you, Windows is still the dominant desktop OS, which compared to what it meant in the 90s is immaterial; people rarely think about writing Windows apps anymore: they write web, iOS and Android apps.) This is the whole point of Thiel's thesis. The contemporary version of this world transition we are witnessing is from search to chatbot.
Meanwhile Microsoft by pushing the "trash" products actually served the industry at large well in other ways: it provided a consistent standard base to widely deploy PCs and applications.
Aside: the "competition is for losers" tagline is not from Thiel himself: apparently the publisher came up with a punchy line, and I think that refers to his broader ideology. What I brought up is a very specific observation in his thesis that high margin monopolies are actually good from the perspective of society in a dynamic world where it does not merely translate rent-seeking long-term.
Apple and Google succeeded not by beating Microsoft at its game, but by playing a different game, which happened due to technological revolutions they capitalized on. Apple has a fair claim to partially engendering some of the revolutions; esp. mobile computing. As you said, Window is still the dominant desktop operating system. Who knows what better operating systems people could have been using all this time?
> A lot of the value in big tech comes from scale and integration and is inherently not sensible to have a thousand mom and pop shops do it and keep the same value.
Some of the most impactful large-scale tech that exist today isn't centralized or monopolized. The internet, for example, or email. There's been a long history of "email killers", but no company has been able to replace email yet. One can achieve integration with standardization, and scale through federation.
In fact, I'd say federation scales better than centralization. In spite of appearances, mom and pop shops scale fantastically. Having thousands of independent actors servicing a market makes an industry much more dynamic and resilient. It's why the biggest restaurants are franchises, for example.
I'd add that the period of greatest innovation in the web wasn't 2004 when IE had 95% of the market, or today when Chrome has 65%. Id argue it was that 2008-2018 decade; an era that also saw the most browser variety we've seen recently.
> any other company who is willing to value Chrome at any significant price is inevitably going to need a scaled product to tie this to and accomplish what Google did with Chrome
Chrome could well be an independent company, like Mozilla is. There's plenty of money to be made in being the middle-man for search engines.
"Also hints at why Peter Thiel's thesis on tech monopolies in a dynamic world is correct; i.e. that they aren't necessarily bad. A lot of the value in big tech comes from scale and integration and is inherently not sensible to have a thousand mom and pop shops do it and keep the same value".
Isn't this broadly speaking true about everything, or maybe any luxury service? I guess I would say, that I disagree, I'm not saying you're explicitly wrong, but I think a model where one system or service dominates is a tradeoff. Sure it's more efficient, and maybe you can say "we solved the phone/browser/Operating System/etc" but you lose the world where we had all sorts of weird innovative products.
I’d say the point is more subtle than that: it is not mere efficiency that comes with such scale. Rather, such scale is necessary to enable certain technological investments and long-term risks and behavior. For example, if you were a non-monopoly company in a competitive environment you would not be able to steer Chrome and shape it the way it is. You’d be burdened by day to day business needs to keep the margin from eroding below zero at any given corner.
Under this theory it follows that if you actively kill any business with a monopoly market share like the EU, you’ll guarantee failure for the society in achieving certain technological breakthroughs. The only way to avoid it would be government sanctioned corporations (CCP style) or US style pre-Lina Khan relatively free market approach to scale.
Firstly, Chrome without Google is Chromium. So are we considering that they sell off Chrome, or Chromium? I can't see how Google sells off Chrome and remains Google.
It seems a bit absurd for Google to sell off Chromium and then some other tech giant gets to "own a F/OSS project". I mean, yeah, you own a browser but everybody else is still downstream, including Microsoft, and contributions are open-source, so what do you really own?
If we're really talking about Google selling Chrome itself, then what good is that? Anyone else owning Chrome wouldn't make it the same. Google users rely on Chrome to use Google! Like, that's how I sign in -- through the browser -- and use Workspaces -- through the browser -- and so many other webapps, such as Photos or Contacts or Calendar. And here we've got ChromeOS and Chromebooks widely deployed. That's Chrome too. How to separate Chrome from the Goog? Are you proposing a breakup like the Baby Bells or something?
It's nearly absurd at this point to separate Google from their Chrome. It would be like telling them they can't have Android. But like, that's simply a layer in their tapestry of services. You're going to pull on that thread for what reason?
It sounds like you are referring to Search. Search hardly even counts -- it's perfectly usable without an account and it's accessible through so many avenues. When I referred to "using Google", I meant Google's web app properties that are typically provisioned through the web browser, like Workspaces. Sorry for the confusion, but I consider Search to be deprecated and hardly even worthy of notice, these days!
This is indeed about Google selling Chrome itself - an action sought by the DOJ in court, not just a rumor. Where to draw the line of divestiture is exactly the interesting question. That the #1 browser can't even be logically separated from calendar and photo services in your head is precisely why the DOJ wants this thread pulled.
> That the #1 browser can't even be logically separated
But it can...
I mean, we’re talking about web apps, SaaS in the cloud. These can be delivered via PWA, any browser, Android or iOS app.
The fact that Chrome is Google’s flagship frontend to web-based apps is nearly immaterial. I can and do access their entire suite through Firefox, Safari, Chromium, etc.
It is simply the fact that they have built a shiny and well-refined branding on top of Chromium, and so I still don’t see the point of divestment, or what the web app architecture will look like afterwards.
I fully agree it can, I was replying to your initial comment "I can't see how Google sells off Chrome and remains Google". It should be quite easy to see Google remain Google without a web browser, especially since it reached $200 billion market cap before adding one.
The important integrations have more to do with profile sync, crash reporting, the branding, the Chrome+ChromeOS portions of Google Workspace, or things of that type. Actually accessing the Google websites to the level you could from any other browser is not one of the tie-in issues. The same goes for the removal any cross promotion of services (e.g. google.com promoting installing Chrome) but that'd be pretty naturally severed if Chrome were 3rd party rather than Google (and is another example of how Chromium existing is not really the same story).
I agree with the article that it’s difficult. What if Google was still allowed to distribute their apps via embedded Chromium, but were not allowed to ship the Chrome derivative as a full-fledged browser?
That may still leave them some incentive to participate in its development since many of their web apps are optimized against Chromium, but they are not allowed the business advantage of the technology as it exists today.
The would-be acquirer, I guess, would be forbidden from duplicating the business model. The logical question is, well how would that acquirer make any money?
My hunch is that Chrome would just become a dead brand and the browser engine could live on as an embeddable technology. That still might provide value to a would-be owner, but they would make their money off of products making good use of the browser engine and not the engine itself for web browsing.
Having a world class browser engine is valuable to application development still. It has core value, just not as a vehicle for making money in a standalone way.
Maybe it’s hard to make sense of because monetizing a browser directly is, and arguably always has been, kind of… stupid.
The answer might be found looking at something like Deno Deploy. They realistically can’t monetize the language/runtime because it doesn’t make any sense. They capture commercial value by offering to run your code in a seamless way.
I don’t know. Maybe an AI company is a decent fit - they can run it as an agent/scraping service and make money that way. An automotive company could buy it and sell an optimized version for Infotainment systems for other car manufacturers as well. There’s money to be made off of selling it as a platform, but probably not as an Internet browser.
I’m sure Google itself could have thought of a billion other ways to make money off it but they were just too lazy to dream it up because it wasn’t aligned to their core business.
The article ignores Firefox switched the contract to Yahoo as the default search provider from 2014-2017, in complete absence of any requirement to do so. Even if everyone did keep using Google, having Chrome be funded externally through search revenue rather than internally still frees the browser from a lot of over-alignment with other Google desires (e.g. ad blocking, ad APIs, promoting of the Google browser on unrelated Google services).
All that aside, the article doesn't really make much of an argument as to why 3 billion current users shouldn't be worth lots of money to someone wanting to try to monetize (even if the author doesn't see a good monetization opportunity). It, instead, focuses on why the Google integrations Chrome had are what made it popular. One of the biggest differences between Google selling Chrome and any old chromium fork is precisely that the "other" browsers no longer have to try to compete with Google's own browser to get users to monetize.
> The article ignores Firefox switched the contract to Yahoo as the default search provider from 2014-2017
I worked at Mozilla when this deal was struck. The deal with Yahoo did require Yahoo be the default for Firefox, I'm not sure what you mean by "absence of any requirement"?
Mozilla broke that contract with Yahoo (there was a clause allowing them to do so without repercussion and keep the money, if they deemed it better for the users, wild contract) less than 3 years later because users hated Yahoo so much, and went back to Google.
Google is dominant because it just _is_ the best search engine.
> One of the biggest differences between Google selling Chrome and any old chromium fork is precisely that the "other" browsers no longer have to try to compete with Google's own browser to get users to monetize.
Isn't that literally anti-competitive? The DoJ is saying Google search is dominant partially because of Chrome pushing users to Google.
You're saying Chrome is dominant because users like it too much, and other browsers can't compete? Tough, that's the users' choice, though.
> I worked at Mozilla when this deal was struck. The deal with Yahoo did require Yahoo be the default for Firefox, I'm not sure what you mean by "absence of any requirement"?
Absence of any requirement to not choose Google (as the article argues would be the only possibility the choice would ever be made), not absence of some requirement in the specific contract itself.
> Mozilla broke that contract with Yahoo (there was a clause allowing them to do so without repercussion and keep the money, if they deemed it better for the users, wild contract) less than 3 years later because users hated Yahoo so much, and went back to Google.
Yes, 2014-2017, as was originally stated. This has two implications: first, Firefox was able to monetize the (much smaller) user base for $375,000,000/y for 3 years at the time using a non-Google search deal. Second, such deals still didn't make sense when you could get the same or more from Google and users would like it. The latter is not really a damnation blocking such action from Google would fail, it's just repeating the problems with Google's dominance in the space. Barring blocking, there is still clear leverage to get money out of the deal from Google without allowing Google to cross-influence markets.
A potential 3rd implication is Google search is (probably) still the favorite of users today and, if allowed, Google would have to fairly bid this deal to a 3rd party rather than operate the browser under fully in-house control.
> Isn't that literally anti-competitive? The DoJ is saying Google search is dominant partially because of Chrome pushing users to Google.
Companies found to be abusing operating a monopoly in an area generally have legal repercussions applied which would normally be considered unfair in order to restore balance to the market they were found to abuse. Maybe you don't like that, I can't argue that, but actions to break up an existing monopoly being unfair are not supported by the same arguments as why as actions of a company abusing a monopoly are unfair so disallowing one does not inherently negate the other.
> You're saying Chrome is dominant because users like it too much, and other browsers can't compete? Tough, that's the users' choice, though.
I don't recall saying that, no. Google Search and Chrome are dominant because exclusive agreements and many acts of attacking competition across markets by leveraging popularity in one area to unfairly stifle competition in another. To be the most liked/popular is orthogonal to these problems. A popular service is not inherently anti-competitive, but Google didn't keep ending up in court solely because it's popular.
IMO the value is in the user base (imagine switching 3 billion people to ChatGPT overnight) and I don't understand why Gruber says the users can't be sold.
This is a good take. Also hints at why Peter Thiel's thesis on tech monopolies in a dynamic world is correct; i.e. that they aren't necessarily bad. A lot of the value in big tech comes from scale and integration and is inherently not sensible to have a thousand mom and pop shops do it and keep the same value. To the extent that Google is doing anything nefarious as a monopoly with integration, any other company who is willing to value Chrome at any significant price is inevitably going to need a scaled product to tie this to and accomplish what Google did with Chrome. They cannot pull this off on their own even though the open-source Chromium exists, because Google is actually better than them at maintaining a browser ecosystem. I am certain they will do a worse job at owning Chrome, especially considering Google has shown a good faith effort in shipping a browser and keeping the engine open source.
Ironically, this whole saga is happening at the same time the "Google search business is under attack" is at its peak in the news media.
Thiel speaks from the perspective of the monopolist, pithily condensed to 'competition is for losers'. Any product involves a set of trade-offs, and decisions. It is not a law of nature that the monopoly product makes trade-offs everyone, or even anyone, is happy with: people could identify ways the product could be improved. But under a monopoly they can't vote with their wallets. Consider Microsoft in the 80s and 90s. They were, realistically speaking, the only game in town. What efficiency did their monopoly help achieve, and why did it justify the stifling of choice? Maximizing efficiency is a more tenable argument when the product is undifferentiated, which is not the case in technology.
The point is precisely that being super fixated on Microsoft as a monopoly producing relatively trash-quality products is a static worldview. It is the case that Microsoft monopoly did not in any shape or form preclude a measly search startup and a beleaguered Cupertino company from surpassing it to the slightest (mind you, Windows is still the dominant desktop OS, which compared to what it meant in the 90s is immaterial; people rarely think about writing Windows apps anymore: they write web, iOS and Android apps.) This is the whole point of Thiel's thesis. The contemporary version of this world transition we are witnessing is from search to chatbot. Meanwhile Microsoft by pushing the "trash" products actually served the industry at large well in other ways: it provided a consistent standard base to widely deploy PCs and applications.
Aside: the "competition is for losers" tagline is not from Thiel himself: apparently the publisher came up with a punchy line, and I think that refers to his broader ideology. What I brought up is a very specific observation in his thesis that high margin monopolies are actually good from the perspective of society in a dynamic world where it does not merely translate rent-seeking long-term.
Apple and Google succeeded not by beating Microsoft at its game, but by playing a different game, which happened due to technological revolutions they capitalized on. Apple has a fair claim to partially engendering some of the revolutions; esp. mobile computing. As you said, Window is still the dominant desktop operating system. Who knows what better operating systems people could have been using all this time?
> A lot of the value in big tech comes from scale and integration and is inherently not sensible to have a thousand mom and pop shops do it and keep the same value.
Some of the most impactful large-scale tech that exist today isn't centralized or monopolized. The internet, for example, or email. There's been a long history of "email killers", but no company has been able to replace email yet. One can achieve integration with standardization, and scale through federation.
In fact, I'd say federation scales better than centralization. In spite of appearances, mom and pop shops scale fantastically. Having thousands of independent actors servicing a market makes an industry much more dynamic and resilient. It's why the biggest restaurants are franchises, for example.
I'd add that the period of greatest innovation in the web wasn't 2004 when IE had 95% of the market, or today when Chrome has 65%. Id argue it was that 2008-2018 decade; an era that also saw the most browser variety we've seen recently.
> any other company who is willing to value Chrome at any significant price is inevitably going to need a scaled product to tie this to and accomplish what Google did with Chrome
Chrome could well be an independent company, like Mozilla is. There's plenty of money to be made in being the middle-man for search engines.
"Also hints at why Peter Thiel's thesis on tech monopolies in a dynamic world is correct; i.e. that they aren't necessarily bad. A lot of the value in big tech comes from scale and integration and is inherently not sensible to have a thousand mom and pop shops do it and keep the same value".
Isn't this broadly speaking true about everything, or maybe any luxury service? I guess I would say, that I disagree, I'm not saying you're explicitly wrong, but I think a model where one system or service dominates is a tradeoff. Sure it's more efficient, and maybe you can say "we solved the phone/browser/Operating System/etc" but you lose the world where we had all sorts of weird innovative products.
I mean come on, look at that phone!
https://www.techwalls.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/nokia-n...
I’d say the point is more subtle than that: it is not mere efficiency that comes with such scale. Rather, such scale is necessary to enable certain technological investments and long-term risks and behavior. For example, if you were a non-monopoly company in a competitive environment you would not be able to steer Chrome and shape it the way it is. You’d be burdened by day to day business needs to keep the margin from eroding below zero at any given corner.
Under this theory it follows that if you actively kill any business with a monopoly market share like the EU, you’ll guarantee failure for the society in achieving certain technological breakthroughs. The only way to avoid it would be government sanctioned corporations (CCP style) or US style pre-Lina Khan relatively free market approach to scale.
Yes this is a strange rumor.
Firstly, Chrome without Google is Chromium. So are we considering that they sell off Chrome, or Chromium? I can't see how Google sells off Chrome and remains Google.
It seems a bit absurd for Google to sell off Chromium and then some other tech giant gets to "own a F/OSS project". I mean, yeah, you own a browser but everybody else is still downstream, including Microsoft, and contributions are open-source, so what do you really own?
If we're really talking about Google selling Chrome itself, then what good is that? Anyone else owning Chrome wouldn't make it the same. Google users rely on Chrome to use Google! Like, that's how I sign in -- through the browser -- and use Workspaces -- through the browser -- and so many other webapps, such as Photos or Contacts or Calendar. And here we've got ChromeOS and Chromebooks widely deployed. That's Chrome too. How to separate Chrome from the Goog? Are you proposing a breakup like the Baby Bells or something?
It's nearly absurd at this point to separate Google from their Chrome. It would be like telling them they can't have Android. But like, that's simply a layer in their tapestry of services. You're going to pull on that thread for what reason?
> Google users rely on Chrome to use Google
I don't. Some times I google things because asking chatgpt will take longer, if openai buys it, problem fixed.
It sounds like you are referring to Search. Search hardly even counts -- it's perfectly usable without an account and it's accessible through so many avenues. When I referred to "using Google", I meant Google's web app properties that are typically provisioned through the web browser, like Workspaces. Sorry for the confusion, but I consider Search to be deprecated and hardly even worthy of notice, these days!
This is indeed about Google selling Chrome itself - an action sought by the DOJ in court, not just a rumor. Where to draw the line of divestiture is exactly the interesting question. That the #1 browser can't even be logically separated from calendar and photo services in your head is precisely why the DOJ wants this thread pulled.
> That the #1 browser can't even be logically separated
But it can...
I mean, we’re talking about web apps, SaaS in the cloud. These can be delivered via PWA, any browser, Android or iOS app.
The fact that Chrome is Google’s flagship frontend to web-based apps is nearly immaterial. I can and do access their entire suite through Firefox, Safari, Chromium, etc.
It is simply the fact that they have built a shiny and well-refined branding on top of Chromium, and so I still don’t see the point of divestment, or what the web app architecture will look like afterwards.
I fully agree it can, I was replying to your initial comment "I can't see how Google sells off Chrome and remains Google". It should be quite easy to see Google remain Google without a web browser, especially since it reached $200 billion market cap before adding one.
The important integrations have more to do with profile sync, crash reporting, the branding, the Chrome+ChromeOS portions of Google Workspace, or things of that type. Actually accessing the Google websites to the level you could from any other browser is not one of the tie-in issues. The same goes for the removal any cross promotion of services (e.g. google.com promoting installing Chrome) but that'd be pretty naturally severed if Chrome were 3rd party rather than Google (and is another example of how Chromium existing is not really the same story).
I agree with the article that it’s difficult. What if Google was still allowed to distribute their apps via embedded Chromium, but were not allowed to ship the Chrome derivative as a full-fledged browser?
That may still leave them some incentive to participate in its development since many of their web apps are optimized against Chromium, but they are not allowed the business advantage of the technology as it exists today.
The would-be acquirer, I guess, would be forbidden from duplicating the business model. The logical question is, well how would that acquirer make any money?
My hunch is that Chrome would just become a dead brand and the browser engine could live on as an embeddable technology. That still might provide value to a would-be owner, but they would make their money off of products making good use of the browser engine and not the engine itself for web browsing.
Having a world class browser engine is valuable to application development still. It has core value, just not as a vehicle for making money in a standalone way.
Maybe it’s hard to make sense of because monetizing a browser directly is, and arguably always has been, kind of… stupid.
The answer might be found looking at something like Deno Deploy. They realistically can’t monetize the language/runtime because it doesn’t make any sense. They capture commercial value by offering to run your code in a seamless way.
I don’t know. Maybe an AI company is a decent fit - they can run it as an agent/scraping service and make money that way. An automotive company could buy it and sell an optimized version for Infotainment systems for other car manufacturers as well. There’s money to be made off of selling it as a platform, but probably not as an Internet browser.
I’m sure Google itself could have thought of a billion other ways to make money off it but they were just too lazy to dream it up because it wasn’t aligned to their core business.
The article ignores Firefox switched the contract to Yahoo as the default search provider from 2014-2017, in complete absence of any requirement to do so. Even if everyone did keep using Google, having Chrome be funded externally through search revenue rather than internally still frees the browser from a lot of over-alignment with other Google desires (e.g. ad blocking, ad APIs, promoting of the Google browser on unrelated Google services).
All that aside, the article doesn't really make much of an argument as to why 3 billion current users shouldn't be worth lots of money to someone wanting to try to monetize (even if the author doesn't see a good monetization opportunity). It, instead, focuses on why the Google integrations Chrome had are what made it popular. One of the biggest differences between Google selling Chrome and any old chromium fork is precisely that the "other" browsers no longer have to try to compete with Google's own browser to get users to monetize.
> The article ignores Firefox switched the contract to Yahoo as the default search provider from 2014-2017
I worked at Mozilla when this deal was struck. The deal with Yahoo did require Yahoo be the default for Firefox, I'm not sure what you mean by "absence of any requirement"?
Mozilla broke that contract with Yahoo (there was a clause allowing them to do so without repercussion and keep the money, if they deemed it better for the users, wild contract) less than 3 years later because users hated Yahoo so much, and went back to Google.
Google is dominant because it just _is_ the best search engine.
> One of the biggest differences between Google selling Chrome and any old chromium fork is precisely that the "other" browsers no longer have to try to compete with Google's own browser to get users to monetize.
Isn't that literally anti-competitive? The DoJ is saying Google search is dominant partially because of Chrome pushing users to Google.
You're saying Chrome is dominant because users like it too much, and other browsers can't compete? Tough, that's the users' choice, though.
> I worked at Mozilla when this deal was struck. The deal with Yahoo did require Yahoo be the default for Firefox, I'm not sure what you mean by "absence of any requirement"?
Absence of any requirement to not choose Google (as the article argues would be the only possibility the choice would ever be made), not absence of some requirement in the specific contract itself.
> Mozilla broke that contract with Yahoo (there was a clause allowing them to do so without repercussion and keep the money, if they deemed it better for the users, wild contract) less than 3 years later because users hated Yahoo so much, and went back to Google.
Yes, 2014-2017, as was originally stated. This has two implications: first, Firefox was able to monetize the (much smaller) user base for $375,000,000/y for 3 years at the time using a non-Google search deal. Second, such deals still didn't make sense when you could get the same or more from Google and users would like it. The latter is not really a damnation blocking such action from Google would fail, it's just repeating the problems with Google's dominance in the space. Barring blocking, there is still clear leverage to get money out of the deal from Google without allowing Google to cross-influence markets.
A potential 3rd implication is Google search is (probably) still the favorite of users today and, if allowed, Google would have to fairly bid this deal to a 3rd party rather than operate the browser under fully in-house control.
> Isn't that literally anti-competitive? The DoJ is saying Google search is dominant partially because of Chrome pushing users to Google.
Companies found to be abusing operating a monopoly in an area generally have legal repercussions applied which would normally be considered unfair in order to restore balance to the market they were found to abuse. Maybe you don't like that, I can't argue that, but actions to break up an existing monopoly being unfair are not supported by the same arguments as why as actions of a company abusing a monopoly are unfair so disallowing one does not inherently negate the other.
> You're saying Chrome is dominant because users like it too much, and other browsers can't compete? Tough, that's the users' choice, though.
I don't recall saying that, no. Google Search and Chrome are dominant because exclusive agreements and many acts of attacking competition across markets by leveraging popularity in one area to unfairly stifle competition in another. To be the most liked/popular is orthogonal to these problems. A popular service is not inherently anti-competitive, but Google didn't keep ending up in court solely because it's popular.
IMO the value is in the user base (imagine switching 3 billion people to ChatGPT overnight) and I don't understand why Gruber says the users can't be sold.
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