The Bellmac-32 was pretty amazing for its time - yet I note that the article fails to mention the immense debt that it owes to the VAX-11/780 architecture, which preceded it by three years.
The VAX was a 32-bit CPU with a two stage pipeline which introduced modern demand paged virtual memory. It was also the dominant platform for C and Unix by the time the Bellmac-32 was released.
The Bellmac-32 was a 32-bit CPU with a two stage pipeline and demand paged virtual memory very like the VAX's, which ran C and Unix. It's no mystery where it was getting a lot of its inspiration. I think the article makes it sound like these features were more original than they were.
Where the Bellmac-32 was impressive is in their success in implementing the latest features in CMOS, when the VAX was languishing in the supermini world of discrete logic. Ultimately the Bellmax-32 was a step in the right direction, and the VAX line ended up adopting LSI too slowly and became obsolete.
You might want to be more specific by what you mean by "modern", because there were certainly machines with demand-paged virtual memory before the VAX. It was introduced on the Manchester Atlas in 1962; manufacturers that shipped the feature included IBM (on the 360/67 and all but the earliest machines in the 370 line), Honeywell (6180), and, well... DEC (later PDP-10 models, preceding the VAX).
The article says the Bellmac-32 was single-cycle CISC. The VAX was very CISC and very definitely not single cycle.
It would have been good to know more about why the chip failed. There's a mention of NCR, who had their own NCR/32 chips, which leaned more to emulations of the System/370. So perhaps it was orders from management and not so much a technical failure.
Yeah, 1972 - "Nord-5 was Norsk Data's first 32-bit machine and was claimed to be the first 32-bit minicomputer".
The Wikipedia record: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord-5
I read through its instruction set manual, and found an instruction with unusual behaviour: Its 'ASL` (arithmetic shift left) instruction.
It shifts all bits except for the sign bit, leaving it unchanged.
I have read many ISA's manuals and not seen this elsewhere.
Most ISAs don't have separate arithmetic and logic left shift instructions.
On M68K, which does, the difference between `ASL` and `LSL' is only that the former sets the Overflow flag if any of the bits shifted out is different from the resulting sign bit whereas the latter clears it.
Are there still regularly ground-breaking innovations (which ones e.g. in the last decade) coming out of the same lab today, whatever its owner or name?
It's more difficult to innovate today on a similar scale, or with similar impact. It also seems that big budgets don't really help.
Graphene chips are an insanely exciting (hypothetical) technology. A friend of mine predicted in 2010 that these chips will dominate the market in 5 years' time. As of 2025 we can barely make the semiconductors.
Apple makes chips that have both excellent performance per watt, and overall great performance, but they make small generational jumps.
On the other hand, startups, or otherwise small-but-brilliant teams can still produce cool new stuff. The KDE team built KHTML, which was later forked into Webkit by three guys at Apple.
Paxos was founded on theoretical work of three guys.
Brin & Page made Google. In the era of big & expensive iron, the innovation was to use cheap, generic, but distributed compute power, and compensate for hardware failures in software. This resulted in cheaper, more reliable, and more performant solutions.
But yeah, most of the "moonshot factories" just failed to deliver anything interesting. Maybe you need constraints, market pressure?
Bellmac-32 went 32-bit CMOS when everyone else was still twiddling 8-bit NMOS, then got shelved before the afterparty. IEEE giving it a milestone in 2025 is basically a lifetime achievement trophy for the domino-logic DNA inside every phone SoC today late, but deserved
> With no CAD tools available for full-chip verification ... the team resorted to printing oversize Calcomp plots. The schematics showed how the transistors, circuit lines, and interconnects should be arranged inside the chip to provide the desired outputs. The team assembled them on the floor with adhesive tape to create a massive square map more than 6 meters on a side. Kang and his colleagues traced every circuit by hand with colored pencils, searching for breaks, overlaps, or mishandled interconnects.
The article handwaves over why the chip wasn't a success, which makes my first thought of "how much did each chip cost" all the more relevant. This is such an uplifting story until you think about how the 8086 is just about to wipe it off of the map.
During their early success years, Intel has made extremely few innovations. One of their few innovative products was the floating-point coprocessor 8087, which has changed completely how everybody does floating-point computations, and for which they were smart to hire external expertise (i.e. William Kahan) which has brought most of the innovative features.
On the other hand, during those years Intel has been extremely good at adopting very quickly any important innovation made by a competitor, while also succeeding to obtain better manufacturing yields, so that they were able to have greater profits, even with cheaper products.
Bellmac-32 has not been important commercially, but without it a product like Intel 80386 would have appeared only some years later.
With 80386, Intel has switched their production of CPUs from NMOS to CMOS, like also Motorola had done one year earlier with 68020. Both Intel and Motorola have drawn heavily from the experience gained by the industry with Bellmac-32.
The Motorola 68000 was already available before the Bellmac-32. The 68000 programming model was mostly 32-bit, although internally it was limited to 16 bit data and 24 bit addresses. This was fixed by later models in the family.
> The article handwaves over why the chip wasn't a success, which makes my first thought of "how much did each chip cost" all the more relevant.
That's being polite. Attributing the chip's failure to AT&T buying NCR is ridiculous; that happened in 1991.
Here's a rundown of what actually happened:
* After the divestiture, AT&T from 1984 is finally allowed to build and sell computers. (This is also why Unix was not a commercial product from AT&T until then.) Everyone, in and outside AT&T, thinks Ma Bell is immediately going to be an IBM-level player, armed with Bell Labs research and Western Electric engineering. One of many, many such articles that conveys what everyone then expects/anticipates/fears: <https://archive.org/details/microsystems_84_06/page/n121/mod...> If there is anyone that can turn Unix into the robust mainstream operating system (a real market opportunity, given that IBM is still playing with the toy DOS, and DEC and other minicomputer companies are still in denial about the PC's potential), it's AT&T.
* AT&T immediately rolls out a series of superminicomputers (the 3B series) based on existing products Western Digital has made for years for AT&T use (and using the Bellmarc CPU) and, at at the lower end, the 6300 (Olivetti-built PC clone) and UNIX PC (Convergent-built Unix workstation). All are gigantic duds because, despite superb engineering and field-tested products, AT&T has never had to compete with anyone to sell anything before.
* After further fumbling, AT&T buys NCR to jumpstart itself into the industry. It gives up five years later and NCR becomes independent again.
* The end.
>This is such an uplifting story until you think about how the 8086 is just about to wipe it off of the map.
People today have this idea that Intel was this dominant semiconductor company in the 1980s, and that's why IBM chose it as the CPU supplier for the PC. Not at all. Intel was then no more than one of many competing vendors, with nothing in particular differentiating it from Motorola, Zilog, MOS, Western Digital, Fairchild, etc.
The 8088's chief virtue was that it was readily available at a reasonable price; had the PC launched a little later IBM probably would have gone with the 68000, which Intel engineers agreed with everyone else was far superior to the 8086/8088 and 80286. Binary compatibility with them was not even in the initial plan for the 80386, so loathed by everyone (including, again, Intel's own people) was their segmented memory model (and things like the broken A20 line); only during its design, as the PC installed base grew like crazy, did Intel realize that customers wanted to keep running their software. That's why 80386 supports both segmented memory (for backward compatibility with the virtual 8086) and flat. And that flat memory model wasn't put in for OS/2, or Windows NT; it was put in for Unix.
> The 8088's chief virtue was that it was readily available at a reasonable price;
That, and it had a compatible suite of peripheral chips, while the M68K didn't... Something I vaguely recall an Intel FAE gloating about soon after: "And we're going to keep it that way."
AT&T/Western Electric didn't really sell chips. They were a systems company. I actually used a machine with their VME boards (which iirc the company I worked for had been contracted to manufacture and market). Even to us the idea that Western Electric made CPUs seemed surprising. It was cool to be running System V on a desktop machine back then though.
If you were a CS student at UIUC in the late 80s your sophomore weed-out class in C and assembly language coding was on this processor. It was a lot more fun to write for this core compared to Intel.
And it was the only processor I ever used that had a STRCPY opcode.
The Bellmac-32 was pretty amazing for its time - yet I note that the article fails to mention the immense debt that it owes to the VAX-11/780 architecture, which preceded it by three years.
The VAX was a 32-bit CPU with a two stage pipeline which introduced modern demand paged virtual memory. It was also the dominant platform for C and Unix by the time the Bellmac-32 was released.
The Bellmac-32 was a 32-bit CPU with a two stage pipeline and demand paged virtual memory very like the VAX's, which ran C and Unix. It's no mystery where it was getting a lot of its inspiration. I think the article makes it sound like these features were more original than they were.
Where the Bellmac-32 was impressive is in their success in implementing the latest features in CMOS, when the VAX was languishing in the supermini world of discrete logic. Ultimately the Bellmax-32 was a step in the right direction, and the VAX line ended up adopting LSI too slowly and became obsolete.
You might want to be more specific by what you mean by "modern", because there were certainly machines with demand-paged virtual memory before the VAX. It was introduced on the Manchester Atlas in 1962; manufacturers that shipped the feature included IBM (on the 360/67 and all but the earliest machines in the 370 line), Honeywell (6180), and, well... DEC (later PDP-10 models, preceding the VAX).
Also Prime as well in the 70s pre-VAX.
Period might be the best word. Contemporary is also a contender I thought of first, before disqualifying it for implying 'modern'.
The article says the Bellmac-32 was single-cycle CISC. The VAX was very CISC and very definitely not single cycle.
It would have been good to know more about why the chip failed. There's a mention of NCR, who had their own NCR/32 chips, which leaned more to emulations of the System/370. So perhaps it was orders from management and not so much a technical failure.
> introduced modern demand paged virtual memory
Didn't Multics, Project Genie, and TENEX have demand paging long before the VAX?
There was also the Nord-5, which beat the VAX by another couple of years as a 32-bit minicomputer.
Yeah, 1972 - "Nord-5 was Norsk Data's first 32-bit machine and was claimed to be the first 32-bit minicomputer". The Wikipedia record: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord-5
I read through its instruction set manual, and found an instruction with unusual behaviour: Its 'ASL` (arithmetic shift left) instruction.
It shifts all bits except for the sign bit, leaving it unchanged.
I have read many ISA's manuals and not seen this elsewhere. Most ISAs don't have separate arithmetic and logic left shift instructions. On M68K, which does, the difference between `ASL` and `LSL' is only that the former sets the Overflow flag if any of the bits shifted out is different from the resulting sign bit whereas the latter clears it.
The more that we find out about Bell Labs the more we all realize how much of our world they built.
We really could use a place like that today.
There is a place like that today. It is called "Nokia Bell Labs".
This is a valid point.
Are there still regularly ground-breaking innovations (which ones e.g. in the last decade) coming out of the same lab today, whatever its owner or name?
It's more difficult to innovate today on a similar scale, or with similar impact. It also seems that big budgets don't really help.
Graphene chips are an insanely exciting (hypothetical) technology. A friend of mine predicted in 2010 that these chips will dominate the market in 5 years' time. As of 2025 we can barely make the semiconductors.
Apple makes chips that have both excellent performance per watt, and overall great performance, but they make small generational jumps.
On the other hand, startups, or otherwise small-but-brilliant teams can still produce cool new stuff. The KDE team built KHTML, which was later forked into Webkit by three guys at Apple.
Paxos was founded on theoretical work of three guys.
Brin & Page made Google. In the era of big & expensive iron, the innovation was to use cheap, generic, but distributed compute power, and compensate for hardware failures in software. This resulted in cheaper, more reliable, and more performant solutions.
But yeah, most of the "moonshot factories" just failed to deliver anything interesting. Maybe you need constraints, market pressure?
Bellmac-32 went 32-bit CMOS when everyone else was still twiddling 8-bit NMOS, then got shelved before the afterparty. IEEE giving it a milestone in 2025 is basically a lifetime achievement trophy for the domino-logic DNA inside every phone SoC today late, but deserved
> With no CAD tools available for full-chip verification ... the team resorted to printing oversize Calcomp plots. The schematics showed how the transistors, circuit lines, and interconnects should be arranged inside the chip to provide the desired outputs. The team assembled them on the floor with adhesive tape to create a massive square map more than 6 meters on a side. Kang and his colleagues traced every circuit by hand with colored pencils, searching for breaks, overlaps, or mishandled interconnects.
The article handwaves over why the chip wasn't a success, which makes my first thought of "how much did each chip cost" all the more relevant. This is such an uplifting story until you think about how the 8086 is just about to wipe it off of the map.
During their early success years, Intel has made extremely few innovations. One of their few innovative products was the floating-point coprocessor 8087, which has changed completely how everybody does floating-point computations, and for which they were smart to hire external expertise (i.e. William Kahan) which has brought most of the innovative features.
On the other hand, during those years Intel has been extremely good at adopting very quickly any important innovation made by a competitor, while also succeeding to obtain better manufacturing yields, so that they were able to have greater profits, even with cheaper products.
Bellmac-32 has not been important commercially, but without it a product like Intel 80386 would have appeared only some years later.
With 80386, Intel has switched their production of CPUs from NMOS to CMOS, like also Motorola had done one year earlier with 68020. Both Intel and Motorola have drawn heavily from the experience gained by the industry with Bellmac-32.
The Motorola 68000 was already available before the Bellmac-32. The 68000 programming model was mostly 32-bit, although internally it was limited to 16 bit data and 24 bit addresses. This was fixed by later models in the family.
> The article handwaves over why the chip wasn't a success, which makes my first thought of "how much did each chip cost" all the more relevant.
That's being polite. Attributing the chip's failure to AT&T buying NCR is ridiculous; that happened in 1991.
Here's a rundown of what actually happened:
* After the divestiture, AT&T from 1984 is finally allowed to build and sell computers. (This is also why Unix was not a commercial product from AT&T until then.) Everyone, in and outside AT&T, thinks Ma Bell is immediately going to be an IBM-level player, armed with Bell Labs research and Western Electric engineering. One of many, many such articles that conveys what everyone then expects/anticipates/fears: <https://archive.org/details/microsystems_84_06/page/n121/mod...> If there is anyone that can turn Unix into the robust mainstream operating system (a real market opportunity, given that IBM is still playing with the toy DOS, and DEC and other minicomputer companies are still in denial about the PC's potential), it's AT&T.
* AT&T immediately rolls out a series of superminicomputers (the 3B series) based on existing products Western Digital has made for years for AT&T use (and using the Bellmarc CPU) and, at at the lower end, the 6300 (Olivetti-built PC clone) and UNIX PC (Convergent-built Unix workstation). All are gigantic duds because, despite superb engineering and field-tested products, AT&T has never had to compete with anyone to sell anything before.
* After further fumbling, AT&T buys NCR to jumpstart itself into the industry. It gives up five years later and NCR becomes independent again.
* The end.
>This is such an uplifting story until you think about how the 8086 is just about to wipe it off of the map.
People today have this idea that Intel was this dominant semiconductor company in the 1980s, and that's why IBM chose it as the CPU supplier for the PC. Not at all. Intel was then no more than one of many competing vendors, with nothing in particular differentiating it from Motorola, Zilog, MOS, Western Digital, Fairchild, etc.
The 8088's chief virtue was that it was readily available at a reasonable price; had the PC launched a little later IBM probably would have gone with the 68000, which Intel engineers agreed with everyone else was far superior to the 8086/8088 and 80286. Binary compatibility with them was not even in the initial plan for the 80386, so loathed by everyone (including, again, Intel's own people) was their segmented memory model (and things like the broken A20 line); only during its design, as the PC installed base grew like crazy, did Intel realize that customers wanted to keep running their software. That's why 80386 supports both segmented memory (for backward compatibility with the virtual 8086) and flat. And that flat memory model wasn't put in for OS/2, or Windows NT; it was put in for Unix.
> The 8088's chief virtue was that it was readily available at a reasonable price;
That, and it had a compatible suite of peripheral chips, while the M68K didn't... Something I vaguely recall an Intel FAE gloating about soon after: "And we're going to keep it that way."
AT&T/Western Electric didn't really sell chips. They were a systems company. I actually used a machine with their VME boards (which iirc the company I worked for had been contracted to manufacture and market). Even to us the idea that Western Electric made CPUs seemed surprising. It was cool to be running System V on a desktop machine back then though.
If you were a CS student at UIUC in the late 80s your sophomore weed-out class in C and assembly language coding was on this processor. It was a lot more fun to write for this core compared to Intel.
And it was the only processor I ever used that had a STRCPY opcode.
>STRCPY opcode.
whats wrong with rep movsb?
You'd need to run strlen first.