"We know how it moves" is not the reason the question of whether a submarine swims is not interesting. It's because the question is mainly about the definition of the word "swim" rather than about capabilities.
> if that's what we mean by the question whether a machine can think
That's the issue. The question of whether a machine can think (or reason) is a question of word definitions, not capabilities. The capabilities questions are the ones that matter.
> The capabilities questions are the ones that matter.
Yes, that's what I'm saying. I also think there's a clear sense in which asking whether machines can think is a question about capabilities, even though we would need a more precise definition of "thinking" to be able to answer it.
So that's how I'd sum it up: we know the capabilities of submarines, and whether we say they're swimming or not doesn't answer any further question about those capabilities. We don't know the capabilities of machines; the interesting questions are about what they can do, and one (imprecise) way of asking that question is whether they can think
> I also think there's a clear sense in which asking whether machines can think is a question about capabilities, even though we would need a more precise definition of "thinking" to be able to answer it.
The second half of the sentence contradicts the first. It can't be a clear question about capabilities without widespread agreement on a more rigorous definition of the word "think". Dijkstra's point is that the debate about word definitions is irrelevant and a distraction. We can measure and judge capabilities directly.
"We know how it moves" is not the reason the question of whether a submarine swims is not interesting. It's because the question is mainly about the definition of the word "swim" rather than about capabilities.
> if that's what we mean by the question whether a machine can think
That's the issue. The question of whether a machine can think (or reason) is a question of word definitions, not capabilities. The capabilities questions are the ones that matter.
> The capabilities questions are the ones that matter.
Yes, that's what I'm saying. I also think there's a clear sense in which asking whether machines can think is a question about capabilities, even though we would need a more precise definition of "thinking" to be able to answer it.
So that's how I'd sum it up: we know the capabilities of submarines, and whether we say they're swimming or not doesn't answer any further question about those capabilities. We don't know the capabilities of machines; the interesting questions are about what they can do, and one (imprecise) way of asking that question is whether they can think
> I also think there's a clear sense in which asking whether machines can think is a question about capabilities, even though we would need a more precise definition of "thinking" to be able to answer it.
The second half of the sentence contradicts the first. It can't be a clear question about capabilities without widespread agreement on a more rigorous definition of the word "think". Dijkstra's point is that the debate about word definitions is irrelevant and a distraction. We can measure and judge capabilities directly.
> Dijkstra's point is that the debate about word definitions is irrelevant and a distraction.
Agreed, and I've made this point a few times, so it's ironic we're going back and forth about this.
> The second half of the sentence contradicts the first.
I'm not saying the question is clear. I'm saying there's clearly an interpretation of it as a question about capabilities.