I'm an enthusiastic Cantor skeptic, I lean very heavily constructivist to the point of almost being a finitist, but nonetheless I think the thesis of this article is basically correct.
Nature and the universe is all about continuous quantities; integral quantities and whole numbers represent an abstraction. At a micro level this is less true -- elementary particles specifically are a (mostly) discrete phenomenon, but representing the state even of a very simple system involves continuous quantities.
But the Cantor vision of the real numbers is just wrong and completely unphysical. The idea of arbitrary precision is intrinsically broken in physical reality. Instead I am off the opinion that computation is the relevant process in the physical universe, so approximations to continuous quantities are where the "Eternal Nature" line lies, and the abstraction of the continuum is just that -- an abstraction of the idea of having perfect knowledge of the state of anything in the universe.
You know it wouldn't be possible for us to tell the difference between a rational universe (one where all quantities are rational numbers) and a real universe (one where you can have irrational quantities).
The standard construction for the real numbers is to start with the rationals and "fill in all the holes". So why even bother with filling in the holes and instead just declare God created the rationals?
As in why bother using real numbers in physics? Mostly because you need them to make the maths rigorous. You can't do rigorous calculus (i.e. real analysis) on rationals alone.
You don't need the full set of real numbers to do physics, only the computable subset of the real numbers. Using the full reals is mostly done out of simplicity.
A computable real number is a real number for which a Turing Machine exists that can compute it to any arbitrary precision.
So yes sqrt(2) is computable.
Every BB(n) is computable since every every natutal number can be computed. It's the BB function itself that is not computable in general, not the specific output of that function for a given input.
That doesn’t sound right to me. What about the machines that don’t halt? You can’t compute whether or not to skip them directly.
> A busy beaver hunter who goes by Racheline has shown that the question of whether Antihydra halts is closely related to a famous unsolved problem in mathematics called the Collatz conjecture. Since then, the team has discovered many other six-rule machines with similar characteristics. Slaying the Antihydra and its brethren will require conceptual breakthroughs in pure mathematics.
> You can't do rigorous calculus (i.e. real analysis) on rationals alone.
Yep, but that wasn't my point.
My point was that it is possible that all values in our universe are rational, and it wouldn't be possible for us to tell the difference between this and a universe that has irrational numbers. This fact feels pretty cursed, so I wanted to point it out.
You can make this statement for any dense subset of the reals, but we don’t because that would be silly.
I think the conceit is supposed to be that analysis—and therefore the reals—is the “language of nature” more so than that we can actually find the reals using scientific instruments.
To illustrate the point, using the rationals is just one way of constructing the reals. Try arguing that numbers with a finite decimal representation are the divine language of nature, for example.
Plus, maybe a hot take, but really I think there’s nothing natural about the rationals. Try using them for anything practical. If we used more base-60 instead of base-10 we could probably forget about them entirely.
I would argue that even the rational numbers are unphysical in the same way that the integers are!
The idea that a quantity like 1/3 is meaningfully different than 333/1000 or 3333333/10000000 is not really that interesting on its own; only in the course of a physical process (a computation) would these quantities be interestingly different, and then only in the sense of the degree of approximation that is required for the computation.
The real numbers in the intuitionalist sense are the ground truth here in my opinion; the Cantorian real numbers are busted, and the rationals are too abstract.
I think this is right. Any measurement will have finite precision, so while we might be able to discover some maximum precision that the universe uses eventually, we won't ever be able to prove that the universe has infinite precision representations from finite precision measurements.
Only so long as we use the rationals as an approximation. If we expect them to be exact then they are as bad as the integers.
The continuum is the reality that we have to hold to. Not the continuum in the Cantor sense, but in the intuitionalist or constructivist sense, which is continuously varying numbers that can be approximated as necessary.
> You know it wouldn't be possible for us to tell the difference between a rational universe (one where all quantities are rational numbers) and a real universe (one where you can have irrational quantities).
Citation needed.
Especially since there are well-established math proofs of irrational numbers.
The argument is essentially that you can only measure things to finite precision. And for any measurement you've made at this finite precision, there exist both infinitely rational and irrational numbers. So it's impossible to rule out that the actual value you measured is one of those infinitely many rational numbers.
This argument feels like it's assuming the conclusion. If in principle it is only possible to measure quantities to finite precision, then it follows logically that we couldn't tell the difference between a rational and real universe. The question is, is the premise true here?
AFAIK it would take an infinite amount of time to measure something to infinite precision, at least by the usual ways we’d think to do so…. I suppose one could assume a universe where that somehow isn’t the case, but (to my knowledge) that’s firmly in science-fiction territory.
I don't think time and measurement precision are necessarily related in that way. You can measure weight with increased precision by using a more precise scale, without increasing the time it takes to do the measurement.
The real point is that it takes infinite energy to get infinite precision.
Let me add that we have no clue how to do a measurement that doesn't involve a photon somewhere, which means that it's pure science fiction to think of infinite precision for anything small enough to be disturbed by a low-energy photon.
I'm not making the case that it is possible to make measurements with infinite precision. I'm making the case that the argument "It is not possible to make measurements with infinite precision, therefore we cannot tell if we live in a rational or a real world." is begging the question. The conclusion follows logically from the premise. Unless the argument is just "we can't currently distinguish between a rational and a real world", but that seems trivial.
There are limits to precision there too. The amount of available matter to build something out of and the size you can build down to before quantum effects interfere.
> Nature and the universe is all about continuous quantities
One could argue that nature always deals in discrete quantities and we have models that accurately predict these quantities. Then we use math that humans clearly created (limits) to produce similar models, except they imagine continuous inputs.
The quantity of matter and the quantity of electricity are discrete, but work, time and space are continuous, like also any quantities derived from them.
There have been attempts to create discrete models of time and space, but nothing useful has resulted from those attempts.
Most quantities encountered in nature include some dependency on work/energy, time or space, so nature deals mostly in continuous quantities, or more precisely the models that we can use to predict what happens in nature are still based mostly on continuous quantities, despite the fact that about a century and a half have passed since the discreteness of matter and electricity has been confirmed.
I'm under the impression that all our theories of time and space (and thus work) break down at the scale of 1 plank unit and smaller. Which isn't proof that they aren't continuous, but I don't see how you could assert that they are either.
> The idea of arbitrary precision is intrinsically broken in physical reality.
you said a lot and i probably don't understand but doesn't pi contradict this? pi definitely exists in physical reality, wherever there is a circle, and seems to be have a never ending supply of decimal points.
Is there a circle in physical reality? Or only approximate circles, or things we model as circles?
In any case, a believer in computation as reality would say that any digit of π has the potential to exist, as the result of a definite computation, but that the entirety does not actually exist apart from the process used to compute it.
If you mean there are objects that have physical characteristics that involve pi to infinite precision I think the truth is we have not a darn clue. Take a circle, that would have to be a perfect circle. Even our most accurate and precise physical theories only measure and predict things to 10s of decimal places. We do not possess the technology to verify that it's a real true circle to infinite precision, and many reason to think that such a measurement would be impossible.
There is no black hole that is a perfect sphere. That would, at a minimum, require a body with absolutely no angular momentum which isn't in anyway feasible.
Any rotating/spinning black hole will no longer be a perfect sphere.
A black hole is no more a perfect sphere than a sun is. Would gravity from the nearest other black hole not have a deforming effect of at least 2^-64 ?
A non-rotating black hole. Or a rotating black hole with zero charge. Or a rotating black hole with non-zero charge no external magnetic fields. Or a rotating black hole with non-zero charge with non-time-varying external magnetic fields. Or a wart on a frog on a bump on the log on a hole on the bottom of the sea.
Here I'm referring to the cloud of things that Hilbert called "Cantor's Paradise". Basically everything around the notion of cardinality of infinities.
I loosely identify with the schools of intuitinalism/construtivism/finitism. Primary idea is that the Law of the Excluded Middle is not meaningful.
So yes, generally not starting with ZFC.
I can't speak to "truth" in that sense. The skepticism here is skepticism of the utility of the ideas stemming from Cantor's Paradise. It ends up in a very naval-gazing place where you prove obviously false things (like Banach-Tarski) from the axioms but have no way to map these wildly non-constructive ideas back into the real world. Or where you construct a version of the reals where the reals that we can produce via any computation is a set of measure 0 in the reals.
I don't understand why you believe Banach-Tarski to be obviously false. All that BT tells me is that matter is not modeled by a continuum since matter is composed of discrete atoms. This says nothing of the falsity of BT or the continuum.
I understand the construction and the argument, but personally I find the argument of diagonalization should be criticized for using finities to prove statements about infinities.
You must first accept that an infinity can have any enumeration before proving its enumerations lack the specified enumeration you have constructed.
This always bothers me. "Math is math" speaks little to the "truth" of a statement. Math is less objective as much as it rigorously defines its subjectivities.
> Addressing your issue directly, the Axiom of Choice is actively debated:
The axiom of choice is not required to prove Cantor’s theorem, that any set has strictly smaller cardinality than its powerset.
Actually, I can recount the proof here: Suppose there is an injection f: Powerset(A) ↪ A from the powerset of a set A to the set A. Now consider the set S = {x ∈ A | ∃ s ⊆ A, f(s) = x and x ∉ s}, i.e. the subset of A that is both mapped to by f and not included in the set that maps to it. We know that f(S) ∉ S: suppose f(S) ∈ S, then we would have existence of an s ⊆ A such that f(s) = f(S) and f(S) ∉ s; by injectivity, of course s = S and therefore f(S) ∉ S, which contradicts our premise. However, we can now easily prove that there exists an s ⊆ A satisfying f(s) = f(S) and f(S) ∉ s (of course, by setting s = S), thereby showing that f(S) ∈ S, a contradiction.
Perhaps this is an ignorant question, but wouldn't you need AC to select the s ⊆ A whose existence the contradiction depends on? A constructive proof, at least the ones I'm trying to build in my head, stumbles when needing to produce that s to use in the following arguments.
No, because you only have to choose _one_ s for the proof to work, and a finite number of choices is valid in intuitionistic and constructive mathematics.
if we are arguing that natural numbers are made from abstraction, then we must apply that to real numbers as well - quantum values are complex numbers, that only become real once we start asking "what is position of the thing" or "what's its velocity"
> But the Cantor vision of the real numbers is just wrong and completely unphysical.
They're unphysical, and yet the very physical human mind can work with them just fine. They're a perfectly logical construction from perfectly reasonable axioms. There are lots of objects in math which aren't physically realizable. Plato would have said that those sorts of objects are more real than anything which actually exists in "reality".
There are two things being talked about here, and worth teasing them out.
On the one hand, this article is talking about the hierarchy of "physicality" of various mathematical concepts, and they put Cantor's real numbers at the floor. I disagree with that specifically; two quantities are interestingly "unequal" only at the precision where an underlying process can distinguish them. Turing tells us that any underlying process must represent a computation, and that the power of computation is a law of the underlying reality of the universe (this is my view of the Universal Church-Turing Thesis, not necessarily the generally accepted variant).
The other question is whether Cantor's conception of infinity is a useful one in mathematics. Here I think the answer is no. It leads to rabbit holes that are just uninteresting; trying to distinguish inifinities (continuum hypothesis) and leading us to counterintuitive and useless results. Fun to play with, like writing programs that can invoke a HaltingFunction oracle, but does not tell us anything that we can map back to reality. For example, the idea that there are the same number of integers as even integers is a stupid one that in the end does not lead anywhere useful.
Saying that two sets have the same cardinality is equivalent to saying there is a bijection between them. I don't understand how the latter can be useful but not the former?
> For example, the idea that there are the same number of integers as even integers is a stupid one that in the end does not lead anywhere useful.
I am not sure what you are arguing here. We’ve been teaching this to all undergraduate mathematicians for the last century; are you trying to make the point that this part of the curriculum is unnecessary, or that mathematics has not contributed to the wellbeing of society in the last hundred years? Both of these seem like rather difficult positions to defend.
> On the one hand, this article is talking about the hierarchy of "physicality" of various mathematical concepts, and they put Cantor's real numbers at the floor. I disagree with that specifically
I didn't mean to suggest that the reals are the floor of reality, rather that they are more floorlike than the integers.
> The other question is whether Cantor's conception of infinity is a useful one in mathematics. Here I think the answer is no.
Tools are created by transforming nature into something useful to humans. Is Cantor's conception of infinity more natural? I can't really say, but the uselessness and confusion seems more like nature than technology.
The human mind can't work with a real number any more than it can infinity. We box them into concepts and then work with those. An actual raw real number is unfathomable.
I don’t know about you, I can work with it just fine. I know its properties. I can manipulate it. I can prove theorems about it. What more is there?
In fact, if you are to argue that we cannot know a “raw” real number, I would point out that we can’t know a natural number either! Take 2: you can picture two apples, you can imagine second place, you can visualize its decimal representation in Arabic numerals, you can tell me all its arithmetical properties, you can write down its construction as a set in ZFC set theory… but can you really know the number – not a representation of the number, not its properties, but the number itself? Of course not: mathematical objects are their properties and nothing more. It doesn’t even make sense to consider the idea of a “raw” object.
> They're unphysical, and yet the very physical human mind can work with them just fine.
Can it? We can only work with things we can name and the real numbers we can name are an infinitesimal fraction of the real numbers. (The nameable reals and sets of reals have the same cardinality as integers while the rest are a higher cardinality.)
We can work with unnameable things very easily. Take, for instance, every known theorem that quantifies over all real numbers. If you try to argue that proving theorems about these real numbers does not constitute “working with” them, it seems you have chosen a rather deficient definition of “working with” that does not match with how that phrase is used in the real world.
> They're unphysical, and yet the very physical human mind can work with them just fine
Nah, you're likely thinking of the rationals, which are basically just two integers in a halloween costume. Ooh a third, big deal. The overwhelming majority of the reals are completely batshit and you're not working with them "just fine" except in some very hand wavy sense.
the rationals are 3 naturals with in a "2,1" structure.
the first 2 naturals form an integer.
that integer and a 3rd natural constitute a real (but this 3rd natural best be bigger than zero, else we're in trouble)
what I choose to focus after observing the "unphysical" nature of numbers. is the sense of natural opposition (bordering on alternation) between "mathematical true" and "physical true". both are claiming to be really real Reality.
in the mathematical realm, finite things are "impossible", they become "zero", negible in the presence of infinities. it's impossible for the primes to be finite (by contradiction). it's impossible for things (numbers or functions of mathematical objects) to be finite.
but in the physical reality, it's the "infinite things" which become impossible.
the "decimal point" (i.e. scientific notation i.e. positional numeral systems) is truly THE wonder of the world. for some reason I want something better than such a system... so I'm still learning about categories
Personally, I like to split the difference: the physical continuum definitely exists, to whatever extent any physical thing exists, but the real number line (and indeed the completed inductive set of integers) may just be a human-constructed fiction. The physical continuum is not necessarily identical to the real continuum; the latter is just a very useful model that lets us do human things like calculus.
(And the discrepancy might not be in the physical continuum being simpler than the mathematical reals, as some here postulate, but rather in the continuum being far stranger than the reals, in ways we may never observe nor comprehend.)
All math is just a system of ideas, specifically rules that people made up and follow because it's useful.
I'm so used to thinking this way that I don't understand what all the fuss is about, mathematical objects being "real". Ideas are real but they're not real in the way that rocks are.
Whenever there's a mysterious pattern in nature, people have felt the need to assert that some immaterial "thing" makes it so. But this just creates another mystery: what is the relationship between the material and the immaterial realm? What governs that? (Calling one or more of the immaterial entities "God" doesn't really make it any less mysterious.)
If we add entities to our model of reality to answer questions and all it does is create more and more esoteric questions, we should take some advice from Occam's Shovel: when you're in a hole, stop digging.
then maths is really THE absolute best description available of language and nature.
but non-mathematical minds will simply wonder and be amazed at how "maths explains the world", a clear indication that somebody is not thinking like a mathematician.
> Whenever there's a mysterious pattern in nature, people have felt the need to assert that some immaterial "thing" makes it so. But this just creates another mystery: what is the relationship between the material and the immaterial realm?
the relationship between the material and the immaterial pattern beholden by some mind can only be governed by the brain (hardware) wherein said mind stores its knowledge. is that conscious agency "God"? the answer depends on your personally held theological beliefs. I call that agent "me" and understand that "me" is variable, replaceable by "you" or "them" or whomever...
oh, and I love (this kind of figurative) digging. but I use my hands no shovels.
Ideas are real in the way rocks are if we are concerned with their informational being. They are real informationally - ideas and math participate in forming the world. Nowadays, LLMs, Search and other apps probably affect the world even more than any common rock. Which is more real?
The universe requires infinite divisibility, i.e. a dense set. It doesn't require infinite precision, i.e. a complete set. Our equations for the universe require a complete set, but that would be confusing the map with the territory. There is no physical evidence for uncountable infinities, those are purely in the imagination of man.
The physical evidence is quite irrelevant in this case, and there also is no evidence that uncountable infinities do not exist.
This is a problem of modeling optimization. The models based on uncountable "real" numbers are logically consistent and simple to use, so they are adequate for predicting what happens in natural or artificial systems.
All attempts to avoid the uncountable infinities produce models that are both more complicated and also incomplete, as they do not cover all the applications of traditional infinitesimal calculus, topology and geometry.
Unless someone will succeed to present a theory that avoids uncountable infinities while being as simple as the classic theory and being applicable to all the former uses, I see such attempts as interesting, but totally impractical.
Why are rationals special? They represent an exactness in a similarly unphysical way as the integers. The rationals are infinitely precise. 1/3 is not the same as 0.33333 or 0.33333333 or 0.3.
The real numbers exist and are approximable, either by rationals or by decimal expansion. The idea of approximability and computability are the critical things, not the specific representation.
I am confused why you think the exactness of integers and rationals is unphysical. "This egg carton has 12 eggs" is a (boring) physical statement. "You can make 1/3rd of a carton of eggs without cutting an egg" also seems perfectly physical to me. Your problem with zero-point-three-repeating is a quirk of decimal representation, not a mystical property of 1/3.
Egg cartons might sound contrived but the reals don't necessarily make sense without reference to rulers, scales, etc. And in fact the defining completeness / Dedekind cut conditions for the reals are necessary for doing calculus but any physical interpretation is both pretty abstract and probably false in reality.
When I truly grokked complex numbers, I felt as though real numbers were a lie - though I would now say that it was a convenient omission. There are many things that are more naturally described using complex numbers - waves (which much of reality boils down to) immediately come to mind. Even if something does align better with real numbers, it's still just x+0i. Maybe I'll change my mind ~when~ if I finally grok quaternions.
> If the something under examination causes a sense of existential nausea, disorientation, and a deep feeling that is can't possibly work like that, it is divine.
This is a Jewish and Christian conception of God. How can this be true when so many things that give us comfort in the natural world: fresh fruit, shade trees, sunshine and warm sand between our toes, etc., were not created by man?
Even in mathematics itself: how improbable, how ludicrous, how miraculous is it that the 3rd, 4th, and 5th natural numbers -- numbers you could discover by looking at your own hands -- have the amazing property of demonstrating the Pythagorean theorem?
The Islamic ideal of God (Allah) is so much more balanced. God created both the integers AND the reals. He created everything, some things for our comfort and rest, some things to drive us close to madness, and a lot of stuff in between. Peel back enough layers of causality and all of creation has the stamp of the divine.
I want to push back on this, because the Christian conception of God definitely includes the idea that God created all good and comforting things, and is indeed their ultimate source. Like, just because God is transcendent[0] does not mean He cannot create things that are perfectly approachable, understandable, and enjoyable.
[0] Jesus being human changes the calculus quite a lot, of course, as elaborated in e.g. Hebrews 4:14–16. God, who was fully transcendent, became human, hence why Jesus is also called Immanuel/Emmanuel (lit. “God with us”) in the Bible.
> This is a Muslim conception of God. How can this be true when so many things that give us comfort in the natural world: fresh fruit, shade trees, sunshine and warm sand between our toes, etc., were not created by man?
...
> The Jewish [Christian] ideal of God (YHVH) is so much more balanced.
There's enough bigotry out there. Let's not make assumptions about people's beliefs.
Can't say that I'm completely in the headspace to follow the argument, but wanted to add my 2 cents from a few years ago.
Integers come into existence long before god - as the only presumption required is a difference between one thing and another (or nothing).
The integers also create infinite gaps. The primes.
So no - I do not think reals are closer to the divine. They require we import infinity twice to be defined, and I'm undecided on whether our reality has unbounded 'precision' like that - or if 'just' an infinite number of discrete units.
I find primes spooky. They seem to be a concept that exists regardless of reality or universe. How does such a incontrovertible structure arise?
ps. Various numerology phenomena have a similar vibe, and no wonder so many people who go off the deep end tend to get trapped by them. Maybe I will be one of them as I become old and senile :-D
> How does such a incontrovertible structure arise?
yes, I also enjoy trying to answer this question.
what is such an structure even mean? how could it be that simply defining numbers, obersving addition, and generalizing it away into multiplication would yield this natural structure?
It all begins with zero. the predecessor of One, the best known number.
zero can be assumed by anyone. the surprise is how all zeros are the same zero. (by uniqueness of emptyset; but as I hope you can see, I'm a crank. a nutjob. I'll stop
Depends on your view of God. If God existed before creation, there were not two things to compare. I'm not even sure "nothing" existed - maybe God was smart enough to avoid creating "null" values.
Caveat: former Catholic; 50+ years of fervent atheism.
But all numbers are abstractions, there is nothing “real” (pun unintended) about any number, so it seems strange to me to judge certain numbers on whether they map to our physical reality.
Not that I am well-versed in this, but it seems this is the cause-effect equivalent of the whole containing the part and not the other way around (or something greater can contain something smaller, but not conversely.)
I'm an enthusiastic Cantor skeptic, I lean very heavily constructivist to the point of almost being a finitist, but nonetheless I think the thesis of this article is basically correct.
Nature and the universe is all about continuous quantities; integral quantities and whole numbers represent an abstraction. At a micro level this is less true -- elementary particles specifically are a (mostly) discrete phenomenon, but representing the state even of a very simple system involves continuous quantities.
But the Cantor vision of the real numbers is just wrong and completely unphysical. The idea of arbitrary precision is intrinsically broken in physical reality. Instead I am off the opinion that computation is the relevant process in the physical universe, so approximations to continuous quantities are where the "Eternal Nature" line lies, and the abstraction of the continuum is just that -- an abstraction of the idea of having perfect knowledge of the state of anything in the universe.
You know it wouldn't be possible for us to tell the difference between a rational universe (one where all quantities are rational numbers) and a real universe (one where you can have irrational quantities).
The standard construction for the real numbers is to start with the rationals and "fill in all the holes". So why even bother with filling in the holes and instead just declare God created the rationals?
As in why bother using real numbers in physics? Mostly because you need them to make the maths rigorous. You can't do rigorous calculus (i.e. real analysis) on rationals alone.
You don't need the full set of real numbers to do physics, only the computable subset of the real numbers. Using the full reals is mostly done out of simplicity.
What do you mean by "the computable subset of the reals" formally?
Is sqrt(2) computable?
Is BB(777) computable?
Is [the integer that happens to be equal to BB(777), not that I can prove it, written out in normal decimal notation] computable?
A computable real number is a real number for which a Turing Machine exists that can compute it to any arbitrary precision.
So yes sqrt(2) is computable.
Every BB(n) is computable since every every natutal number can be computed. It's the BB function itself that is not computable in general, not the specific output of that function for a given input.
That doesn’t sound right to me. What about the machines that don’t halt? You can’t compute whether or not to skip them directly.
> A busy beaver hunter who goes by Racheline has shown that the question of whether Antihydra halts is closely related to a famous unsolved problem in mathematics called the Collatz conjecture. Since then, the team has discovered many other six-rule machines with similar characteristics. Slaying the Antihydra and its brethren will require conceptual breakthroughs in pure mathematics.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/busy-beaver-hunters-reach-num...
What specifically doesn't sound right?
> You can't do rigorous calculus (i.e. real analysis) on rationals alone. Yep, but that wasn't my point.
My point was that it is possible that all values in our universe are rational, and it wouldn't be possible for us to tell the difference between this and a universe that has irrational numbers. This fact feels pretty cursed, so I wanted to point it out.
You can make this statement for any dense subset of the reals, but we don’t because that would be silly.
I think the conceit is supposed to be that analysis—and therefore the reals—is the “language of nature” more so than that we can actually find the reals using scientific instruments.
To illustrate the point, using the rationals is just one way of constructing the reals. Try arguing that numbers with a finite decimal representation are the divine language of nature, for example.
Plus, maybe a hot take, but really I think there’s nothing natural about the rationals. Try using them for anything practical. If we used more base-60 instead of base-10 we could probably forget about them entirely.
I would argue that even the rational numbers are unphysical in the same way that the integers are!
The idea that a quantity like 1/3 is meaningfully different than 333/1000 or 3333333/10000000 is not really that interesting on its own; only in the course of a physical process (a computation) would these quantities be interestingly different, and then only in the sense of the degree of approximation that is required for the computation.
The real numbers in the intuitionalist sense are the ground truth here in my opinion; the Cantorian real numbers are busted, and the rationals are too abstract.
I think this is right. Any measurement will have finite precision, so while we might be able to discover some maximum precision that the universe uses eventually, we won't ever be able to prove that the universe has infinite precision representations from finite precision measurements.
Only so long as we use the rationals as an approximation. If we expect them to be exact then they are as bad as the integers.
The continuum is the reality that we have to hold to. Not the continuum in the Cantor sense, but in the intuitionalist or constructivist sense, which is continuously varying numbers that can be approximated as necessary.
> You know it wouldn't be possible for us to tell the difference between a rational universe (one where all quantities are rational numbers) and a real universe (one where you can have irrational quantities).
Citation needed.
Especially since there are well-established math proofs of irrational numbers.
The argument is essentially that you can only measure things to finite precision. And for any measurement you've made at this finite precision, there exist both infinitely rational and irrational numbers. So it's impossible to rule out that the actual value you measured is one of those infinitely many rational numbers.
This argument feels like it's assuming the conclusion. If in principle it is only possible to measure quantities to finite precision, then it follows logically that we couldn't tell the difference between a rational and real universe. The question is, is the premise true here?
AFAIK it would take an infinite amount of time to measure something to infinite precision, at least by the usual ways we’d think to do so…. I suppose one could assume a universe where that somehow isn’t the case, but (to my knowledge) that’s firmly in science-fiction territory.
I don't think time and measurement precision are necessarily related in that way. You can measure weight with increased precision by using a more precise scale, without increasing the time it takes to do the measurement.
The real point is that it takes infinite energy to get infinite precision.
Let me add that we have no clue how to do a measurement that doesn't involve a photon somewhere, which means that it's pure science fiction to think of infinite precision for anything small enough to be disturbed by a low-energy photon.
I'm not making the case that it is possible to make measurements with infinite precision. I'm making the case that the argument "It is not possible to make measurements with infinite precision, therefore we cannot tell if we live in a rational or a real world." is begging the question. The conclusion follows logically from the premise. Unless the argument is just "we can't currently distinguish between a rational and a real world", but that seems trivial.
There are limits to precision there too. The amount of available matter to build something out of and the size you can build down to before quantum effects interfere.
The example was only to illustrate that measurement precision is independent of the time it takes to perform the measurement.
> Nature and the universe is all about continuous quantities
One could argue that nature always deals in discrete quantities and we have models that accurately predict these quantities. Then we use math that humans clearly created (limits) to produce similar models, except they imagine continuous inputs.
The quantity of matter and the quantity of electricity are discrete, but work, time and space are continuous, like also any quantities derived from them.
There have been attempts to create discrete models of time and space, but nothing useful has resulted from those attempts.
Most quantities encountered in nature include some dependency on work/energy, time or space, so nature deals mostly in continuous quantities, or more precisely the models that we can use to predict what happens in nature are still based mostly on continuous quantities, despite the fact that about a century and a half have passed since the discreteness of matter and electricity has been confirmed.
> but work, time and space are continuous
I'm under the impression that all our theories of time and space (and thus work) break down at the scale of 1 plank unit and smaller. Which isn't proof that they aren't continuous, but I don't see how you could assert that they are either.
> The idea of arbitrary precision is intrinsically broken in physical reality.
you said a lot and i probably don't understand but doesn't pi contradict this? pi definitely exists in physical reality, wherever there is a circle, and seems to be have a never ending supply of decimal points.
> wherever there is a circle,
Is there a circle in physical reality? Or only approximate circles, or things we model as circles?
In any case, a believer in computation as reality would say that any digit of π has the potential to exist, as the result of a definite computation, but that the entirety does not actually exist apart from the process used to compute it.
> pi definitely exists in physical reality,
What does it mean to "exist in physical reality"?
If you mean there are objects that have physical characteristics that involve pi to infinite precision I think the truth is we have not a darn clue. Take a circle, that would have to be a perfect circle. Even our most accurate and precise physical theories only measure and predict things to 10s of decimal places. We do not possess the technology to verify that it's a real true circle to infinite precision, and many reason to think that such a measurement would be impossible.
Can you name a physical thing that is a circle even to the baseline precision level of a 64 bit float?
A black hole.
There is no black hole that is a perfect sphere. That would, at a minimum, require a body with absolutely no angular momentum which isn't in anyway feasible.
Any rotating/spinning black hole will no longer be a perfect sphere.
Yeah but if you look down the axis of rotation you will have a perfect (to many decimal places anyways) circle... which was the demand.
A black hole is no more a perfect sphere than a sun is. Would gravity from the nearest other black hole not have a deforming effect of at least 2^-64 ?
A non-rotating black hole. Or a rotating black hole with zero charge. Or a rotating black hole with non-zero charge no external magnetic fields. Or a rotating black hole with non-zero charge with non-time-varying external magnetic fields. Or a wart on a frog on a bump on the log on a hole on the bottom of the sea.
>I'm an enthusiastic Cantor skeptic
A skeptic in what way? He said a lot.
Here I'm referring to the cloud of things that Hilbert called "Cantor's Paradise". Basically everything around the notion of cardinality of infinities.
Please say more, I don't see how you can be _skeptical_ of those ideas.
Math is math, if you start with ZFC axioms you get uncountable infinites.
Maybe you don't start with those axioms. But that has nothing to do with truth, it's just a different mathematical setting.
I loosely identify with the schools of intuitinalism/construtivism/finitism. Primary idea is that the Law of the Excluded Middle is not meaningful.
So yes, generally not starting with ZFC.
I can't speak to "truth" in that sense. The skepticism here is skepticism of the utility of the ideas stemming from Cantor's Paradise. It ends up in a very naval-gazing place where you prove obviously false things (like Banach-Tarski) from the axioms but have no way to map these wildly non-constructive ideas back into the real world. Or where you construct a version of the reals where the reals that we can produce via any computation is a set of measure 0 in the reals.
I don't understand why you believe Banach-Tarski to be obviously false. All that BT tells me is that matter is not modeled by a continuum since matter is composed of discrete atoms. This says nothing of the falsity of BT or the continuum.
> I don't see how you can be _skeptical_ of those ideas.
Well you can be skeptical of anything and everything, and I would argue should be.
Addressing your issue directly, the Axiom of Choice is actively debated: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice#Criticism_and_...
I understand the construction and the argument, but personally I find the argument of diagonalization should be criticized for using finities to prove statements about infinities.
You must first accept that an infinity can have any enumeration before proving its enumerations lack the specified enumeration you have constructed.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cantor%27s_diagonal_argument
> Math is math, if you start with ZFC axioms
This always bothers me. "Math is math" speaks little to the "truth" of a statement. Math is less objective as much as it rigorously defines its subjectivities.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44739315
> Addressing your issue directly, the Axiom of Choice is actively debated:
The axiom of choice is not required to prove Cantor’s theorem, that any set has strictly smaller cardinality than its powerset.
Actually, I can recount the proof here: Suppose there is an injection f: Powerset(A) ↪ A from the powerset of a set A to the set A. Now consider the set S = {x ∈ A | ∃ s ⊆ A, f(s) = x and x ∉ s}, i.e. the subset of A that is both mapped to by f and not included in the set that maps to it. We know that f(S) ∉ S: suppose f(S) ∈ S, then we would have existence of an s ⊆ A such that f(s) = f(S) and f(S) ∉ s; by injectivity, of course s = S and therefore f(S) ∉ S, which contradicts our premise. However, we can now easily prove that there exists an s ⊆ A satisfying f(s) = f(S) and f(S) ∉ s (of course, by setting s = S), thereby showing that f(S) ∈ S, a contradiction.
Perhaps this is an ignorant question, but wouldn't you need AC to select the s ⊆ A whose existence the contradiction depends on? A constructive proof, at least the ones I'm trying to build in my head, stumbles when needing to produce that s to use in the following arguments.
No, because you only have to choose _one_ s for the proof to work, and a finite number of choices is valid in intuitionistic and constructive mathematics.
if we are arguing that natural numbers are made from abstraction, then we must apply that to real numbers as well - quantum values are complex numbers, that only become real once we start asking "what is position of the thing" or "what's its velocity"
> But the Cantor vision of the real numbers is just wrong and completely unphysical.
They're unphysical, and yet the very physical human mind can work with them just fine. They're a perfectly logical construction from perfectly reasonable axioms. There are lots of objects in math which aren't physically realizable. Plato would have said that those sorts of objects are more real than anything which actually exists in "reality".
There are two things being talked about here, and worth teasing them out.
On the one hand, this article is talking about the hierarchy of "physicality" of various mathematical concepts, and they put Cantor's real numbers at the floor. I disagree with that specifically; two quantities are interestingly "unequal" only at the precision where an underlying process can distinguish them. Turing tells us that any underlying process must represent a computation, and that the power of computation is a law of the underlying reality of the universe (this is my view of the Universal Church-Turing Thesis, not necessarily the generally accepted variant).
The other question is whether Cantor's conception of infinity is a useful one in mathematics. Here I think the answer is no. It leads to rabbit holes that are just uninteresting; trying to distinguish inifinities (continuum hypothesis) and leading us to counterintuitive and useless results. Fun to play with, like writing programs that can invoke a HaltingFunction oracle, but does not tell us anything that we can map back to reality. For example, the idea that there are the same number of integers as even integers is a stupid one that in the end does not lead anywhere useful.
> the idea that there are the same number of integers as even integers is a stupid one that in the end does not lead anywhere useful
it leads to the idea that measuring 2 sets via a bijection is a better idea than measuring via containment
That a bijection exists is incredibly useful. But the idea of "measuring" infinite sets in the cardinality sense is not very interesting or useful.
Saying that two sets have the same cardinality is equivalent to saying there is a bijection between them. I don't understand how the latter can be useful but not the former?
> For example, the idea that there are the same number of integers as even integers is a stupid one that in the end does not lead anywhere useful.
I am not sure what you are arguing here. We’ve been teaching this to all undergraduate mathematicians for the last century; are you trying to make the point that this part of the curriculum is unnecessary, or that mathematics has not contributed to the wellbeing of society in the last hundred years? Both of these seem like rather difficult positions to defend.
> On the one hand, this article is talking about the hierarchy of "physicality" of various mathematical concepts, and they put Cantor's real numbers at the floor. I disagree with that specifically
I didn't mean to suggest that the reals are the floor of reality, rather that they are more floorlike than the integers.
> The other question is whether Cantor's conception of infinity is a useful one in mathematics. Here I think the answer is no.
Tools are created by transforming nature into something useful to humans. Is Cantor's conception of infinity more natural? I can't really say, but the uselessness and confusion seems more like nature than technology.
The human mind can't work with a real number any more than it can infinity. We box them into concepts and then work with those. An actual raw real number is unfathomable.
I don’t know about you, I can work with it just fine. I know its properties. I can manipulate it. I can prove theorems about it. What more is there?
In fact, if you are to argue that we cannot know a “raw” real number, I would point out that we can’t know a natural number either! Take 2: you can picture two apples, you can imagine second place, you can visualize its decimal representation in Arabic numerals, you can tell me all its arithmetical properties, you can write down its construction as a set in ZFC set theory… but can you really know the number – not a representation of the number, not its properties, but the number itself? Of course not: mathematical objects are their properties and nothing more. It doesn’t even make sense to consider the idea of a “raw” object.
> They're unphysical, and yet the very physical human mind can work with them just fine.
Can it? We can only work with things we can name and the real numbers we can name are an infinitesimal fraction of the real numbers. (The nameable reals and sets of reals have the same cardinality as integers while the rest are a higher cardinality.)
We can work with unnameable things very easily. Take, for instance, every known theorem that quantifies over all real numbers. If you try to argue that proving theorems about these real numbers does not constitute “working with” them, it seems you have chosen a rather deficient definition of “working with” that does not match with how that phrase is used in the real world.
I would argue that all of those theorems work with nameable sets of real numbers but not with any unnamable real numbers themselves.
> They're unphysical, and yet the very physical human mind can work with them just fine
Nah, you're likely thinking of the rationals, which are basically just two integers in a halloween costume. Ooh a third, big deal. The overwhelming majority of the reals are completely batshit and you're not working with them "just fine" except in some very hand wavy sense.
the rationals are 3 naturals with in a "2,1" structure.
the first 2 naturals form an integer.
that integer and a 3rd natural constitute a real (but this 3rd natural best be bigger than zero, else we're in trouble)
what I choose to focus after observing the "unphysical" nature of numbers. is the sense of natural opposition (bordering on alternation) between "mathematical true" and "physical true". both are claiming to be really real Reality.
in the mathematical realm, finite things are "impossible", they become "zero", negible in the presence of infinities. it's impossible for the primes to be finite (by contradiction). it's impossible for things (numbers or functions of mathematical objects) to be finite.
but in the physical reality, it's the "infinite things" which become impossible.
the "decimal point" (i.e. scientific notation i.e. positional numeral systems) is truly THE wonder of the world. for some reason I want something better than such a system... so I'm still learning about categories
Huh?
> representing the state even of a very simple system involves continuous quantities.
But that's tatamount to the belief that the minutest particle of the universe requires the equivalent of an infinite number of bits of state.
Personally, I like to split the difference: the physical continuum definitely exists, to whatever extent any physical thing exists, but the real number line (and indeed the completed inductive set of integers) may just be a human-constructed fiction. The physical continuum is not necessarily identical to the real continuum; the latter is just a very useful model that lets us do human things like calculus.
(And the discrepancy might not be in the physical continuum being simpler than the mathematical reals, as some here postulate, but rather in the continuum being far stranger than the reals, in ways we may never observe nor comprehend.)
All math is just a system of ideas, specifically rules that people made up and follow because it's useful.
I'm so used to thinking this way that I don't understand what all the fuss is about, mathematical objects being "real". Ideas are real but they're not real in the way that rocks are.
Whenever there's a mysterious pattern in nature, people have felt the need to assert that some immaterial "thing" makes it so. But this just creates another mystery: what is the relationship between the material and the immaterial realm? What governs that? (Calling one or more of the immaterial entities "God" doesn't really make it any less mysterious.)
If we add entities to our model of reality to answer questions and all it does is create more and more esoteric questions, we should take some advice from Occam's Shovel: when you're in a hole, stop digging.
unless you're a mathematician
then maths is really THE absolute best description available of language and nature.
but non-mathematical minds will simply wonder and be amazed at how "maths explains the world", a clear indication that somebody is not thinking like a mathematician.
> Whenever there's a mysterious pattern in nature, people have felt the need to assert that some immaterial "thing" makes it so. But this just creates another mystery: what is the relationship between the material and the immaterial realm?
the relationship between the material and the immaterial pattern beholden by some mind can only be governed by the brain (hardware) wherein said mind stores its knowledge. is that conscious agency "God"? the answer depends on your personally held theological beliefs. I call that agent "me" and understand that "me" is variable, replaceable by "you" or "them" or whomever...
oh, and I love (this kind of figurative) digging. but I use my hands no shovels.
Ideas are real in the way rocks are if we are concerned with their informational being. They are real informationally - ideas and math participate in forming the world. Nowadays, LLMs, Search and other apps probably affect the world even more than any common rock. Which is more real?
God created the rational numbers.
The universe requires infinite divisibility, i.e. a dense set. It doesn't require infinite precision, i.e. a complete set. Our equations for the universe require a complete set, but that would be confusing the map with the territory. There is no physical evidence for uncountable infinities, those are purely in the imagination of man.
The physical evidence is quite irrelevant in this case, and there also is no evidence that uncountable infinities do not exist.
This is a problem of modeling optimization. The models based on uncountable "real" numbers are logically consistent and simple to use, so they are adequate for predicting what happens in natural or artificial systems.
All attempts to avoid the uncountable infinities produce models that are both more complicated and also incomplete, as they do not cover all the applications of traditional infinitesimal calculus, topology and geometry.
Unless someone will succeed to present a theory that avoids uncountable infinities while being as simple as the classic theory and being applicable to all the former uses, I see such attempts as interesting, but totally impractical.
Why are rationals special? They represent an exactness in a similarly unphysical way as the integers. The rationals are infinitely precise. 1/3 is not the same as 0.33333 or 0.33333333 or 0.3.
The real numbers exist and are approximable, either by rationals or by decimal expansion. The idea of approximability and computability are the critical things, not the specific representation.
I am confused why you think the exactness of integers and rationals is unphysical. "This egg carton has 12 eggs" is a (boring) physical statement. "You can make 1/3rd of a carton of eggs without cutting an egg" also seems perfectly physical to me. Your problem with zero-point-three-repeating is a quirk of decimal representation, not a mystical property of 1/3.
Egg cartons might sound contrived but the reals don't necessarily make sense without reference to rulers, scales, etc. And in fact the defining completeness / Dedekind cut conditions for the reals are necessary for doing calculus but any physical interpretation is both pretty abstract and probably false in reality.
When I truly grokked complex numbers, I felt as though real numbers were a lie - though I would now say that it was a convenient omission. There are many things that are more naturally described using complex numbers - waves (which much of reality boils down to) immediately come to mind. Even if something does align better with real numbers, it's still just x+0i. Maybe I'll change my mind ~when~ if I finally grok quaternions.
I think one quaternion contains all complex numbers
I thought this when watching the 3b1b + ben eater collaboration on quaternion visualizers.
von Neumann would say you'll never grok quaternions. but merely get used to them.
Quoth the old Fortran chestnut: "GOD IS REAL (unless declared as an integer)"
> If the something under examination causes a sense of existential nausea, disorientation, and a deep feeling that is can't possibly work like that, it is divine.
This is a Jewish and Christian conception of God. How can this be true when so many things that give us comfort in the natural world: fresh fruit, shade trees, sunshine and warm sand between our toes, etc., were not created by man?
Even in mathematics itself: how improbable, how ludicrous, how miraculous is it that the 3rd, 4th, and 5th natural numbers -- numbers you could discover by looking at your own hands -- have the amazing property of demonstrating the Pythagorean theorem?
The Islamic ideal of God (Allah) is so much more balanced. God created both the integers AND the reals. He created everything, some things for our comfort and rest, some things to drive us close to madness, and a lot of stuff in between. Peel back enough layers of causality and all of creation has the stamp of the divine.
I want to push back on this, because the Christian conception of God definitely includes the idea that God created all good and comforting things, and is indeed their ultimate source. Like, just because God is transcendent[0] does not mean He cannot create things that are perfectly approachable, understandable, and enjoyable.
[0] Jesus being human changes the calculus quite a lot, of course, as elaborated in e.g. Hebrews 4:14–16. God, who was fully transcendent, became human, hence why Jesus is also called Immanuel/Emmanuel (lit. “God with us”) in the Bible.
> This is a Muslim conception of God. How can this be true when so many things that give us comfort in the natural world: fresh fruit, shade trees, sunshine and warm sand between our toes, etc., were not created by man?
...
> The Jewish [Christian] ideal of God (YHVH) is so much more balanced.
There's enough bigotry out there. Let's not make assumptions about people's beliefs.
Can't say that I'm completely in the headspace to follow the argument, but wanted to add my 2 cents from a few years ago.
Integers come into existence long before god - as the only presumption required is a difference between one thing and another (or nothing). The integers also create infinite gaps. The primes.
So no - I do not think reals are closer to the divine. They require we import infinity twice to be defined, and I'm undecided on whether our reality has unbounded 'precision' like that - or if 'just' an infinite number of discrete units.
I find primes spooky. They seem to be a concept that exists regardless of reality or universe. How does such a incontrovertible structure arise?
ps. Various numerology phenomena have a similar vibe, and no wonder so many people who go off the deep end tend to get trapped by them. Maybe I will be one of them as I become old and senile :-D
> How does such a incontrovertible structure arise?
yes, I also enjoy trying to answer this question.
what is such an structure even mean? how could it be that simply defining numbers, obersving addition, and generalizing it away into multiplication would yield this natural structure?
It all begins with zero. the predecessor of One, the best known number.
zero can be assumed by anyone. the surprise is how all zeros are the same zero. (by uniqueness of emptyset; but as I hope you can see, I'm a crank. a nutjob. I'll stop
Depends on your view of God. If God existed before creation, there were not two things to compare. I'm not even sure "nothing" existed - maybe God was smart enough to avoid creating "null" values.
Caveat: former Catholic; 50+ years of fervent atheism.
But all numbers are abstractions, there is nothing “real” (pun unintended) about any number, so it seems strange to me to judge certain numbers on whether they map to our physical reality.
God is a FRACTRAN program.
> the principle that there is more reality in a cause than in its effect
What a weird idea. Why would that be?
Not that I am well-versed in this, but it seems this is the cause-effect equivalent of the whole containing the part and not the other way around (or something greater can contain something smaller, but not conversely.)
His footnotes are out of order.
I'm glad someone noticed.
Determining the real order is left as an exercise for the reader.
13 points and 18 comments here yesterday: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45053007