When the bad guys are too impatient to wait until you leave the computer but not fast enough to stop you before 30 degrees while keeping the convenience of life.
If this were a concern for me the better choice is shutting down the laptop to encrypt the drive and disable biometrics. This does nothing since the drive is still unencrypted.
I remember way back in the day, there was some question as to the legality of compelled unlocking of devices; IIRC, it’s been deemed legal to compel a fingerprint, but illegal (under the first amendment?) to compel entry of a password—IIRC, as long as that password hasn’t been written down anywhere.
I gather this is written to that end primarily? Or is there some other goal as well?
I wrote this after the case of a Washington Post reporter, Hannah Natanson, was compelled to unlock her computer with her fingerprint. This resulted in access to her Desktop Signal on her computer, revealing sources and their conversations.
(I've put a copy of this text at the top of the thread, since it's standard for Show HNs to have some intro/background up there. I hope that's ok with you!)
There's also the issue that the device is covered in fingerprints, and if you can build a clean image of the print, you can likely manufacture a gelatin copy of that fingerprint that will work on most fingerprint scanners.
I can't speak to the current generation of Apple fingerprint scanners, but historically iirc you can grab a print, clean it up in Photoshop, print it on OHP transparency using a laser printer and use it like a mould to copy a fingerprint.
While it's true that the legality of law enforcement forcing passwords in unclear, courts can absolutely force you to enter a password even if it's not written down by holding you in contempt indefinitely.
>courts can absolutely force you to enter a password even if it's not written down by holding you in contempt indefinitely.
This is not true outside of a narrow exception. Indeed this is the core point of the 5th Amendment, to protect you from having to be witness against yourself. It's just as binding on the judicial branch as it is on the executive. Ordinarily, a court may not compel a defendant to testify or say something that could incriminate them.
The narrow exception is the "foregone conclusion doctrine", which allows compelling testimony about specific evidence the government legally knows exists, knows the defendant controls access to, and knows is authentic. All of which has a bunch of caselaw around it. The textbook example is somebody has a device open, and an officer directly witnesses illegal material on it, but before they can seize it the person manages to turn it off and now it cannot be accessed without a password. So the government can say "we witnessed this specific illegal material, and this device is owned by the defendant and we can prove from video that they have accessed the device, and we want access to that specific material". But if you're just crossing the border with a locked device, they cannot compel the password just to search through it, or even if they're suspicious of something specific. They need actual knowledge, either through their own evidence or because the person foolishly talks and confesses something.
Otherwise they can definitely physically seize the device for a time (which could be very inconvenient/expensive depending) but that's it.
Take it to the logical end - you can tie up / handcuff / sedate / restrain an individual in order to get their fingerprint (or, ahem, way worse) but you cannot extract a password from someones brain.
How beneficial is this versus just being theater? The example used in this is the government accessing the reporters laptop via biometrics.
But in this case, and especially under this admin legal or not this app won't stop them, unless I'm misunderstanding the macOS security model. Even with FDE enabled, sending it to the lock screen with biometrics disabled will not do anything to stop them from being able to access the contents of the hard drive via forensic methods with relative ease.
I think that at best this will only stop the casual person (i.e. a family member or roommate/random snooper)? In which case there would be no point to switch away from biometrics.
You're far better off just keeping more private information on the iPhone and isolating that data from a Mac, since that has far more resistance to intrusion in AFU mode than a Mac.
My interpretation was that it's easier to physically force someone to mash their finger on the sensor than to get them to divulge a password, not that it offers you any kind of legal protection. But yeah, it's a plausible but somewhat contrived situation to find yourself in.
It does offer you legal protection. In the US, the right to not self incriminate protect you from divulging passwords but does not protect you from giving up biometrics. In other countries the rule is different.
This is great. I see many times "security advice" against biometrics replacing password unlock, but most of the time I am more worried about getting recorded by somebody/something while typing a password in the open than anything else. This makes it better for those other cases.
I've thought the Apple platform has two glaring omissions
- touchid and biometric configuration profiles (standard, paranoid, extra paranoid)
- versioning for icloud backup
The simple fact is that there is no one-sized-fits-all use case for this.
Biometrics are great for the average user! They reduce shoulder surfing and increase security.
But for some users, you might want two factor for biometrics (such as an apple watch), or short windows before password entry is forced. You might want both biometrics AND password entry required. You might want to enable biometrics only when two factor is enabled.
Look, I'm not saying that what I've said is the ideal setup, by the way. Just that there is a lot of room for improvement versus the status quo.
macOS can in fact be configured to use a third party idp, including interactive elements, on loginwindow.
So, you could build your own through the ExtensibleSingleSignOn and Extensible Enterprise SSO macOS plugin API. You would do touchid, and then have it pop your own custom window/app, providing a prompt through that API, except it's just a hardcoded value (or some shit idk)
So yes, macOS can in fact do that. Just not out of the box. I strongly believe that it is a glaring omission, or at least something they should gate through lockdown mode. idk!
This would be perfect if it could monitor the force with which the lid is closed (macs have accelerometers after all, either this info or an acceptable proxy could be derived?).
Gently close? no action.
Stronger, faster action? Disable touch ID
Slam shut in full panic? yeah disable all biometrics, lose all state, even wipe the ram and the filevault key if it's an option
Perfect rage quitting machine. There should be an enterprise version: when lid is closed with full force it also sends a professional resignation letter to the current employer.
The iOS equivalent is to hold the side + volume button until the power slider shows up. Cancel out of it and the next unlock will require your passcode. Pressing the side button 5x triggers Emergency SOS which does the same thing. Been there forever but barely anyone knows about it.
> in sensitive situations, law enforcement and border agents in many countries can compel a biometric unlock in ways they cannot with a password.
If the threat model includes state-level actors, then disabling biometrics won't prevent data from being retrieved from physical memory. It would probably be wiser to enable disk encryption and have a panic button that powers down/hibernates the computer so that no unencrypted data remains on RAM.
The website says shutdown "takes time" and "kills your session" but a hibernation button would take effect just as fast and would preserve the session.
How do you define "state-level actor?" Police departments certainly have access to state and federal forensic resources to access unencrypted data in memory.
In the context of breaking into phones and laptops, "state-level actor" usually implies a team of people with NSA-type forensic capabilities. That is, they have deep expertise in infosec and related topics, access to 0days that the security apparatus has hoarded and kept secret for their own use, and they may have bespoke hardware to facilitate attacking the device.
A random cop might have access to a Cellebrite machine but they can't just call up the NSA and ask them to break into some drug dealer's macbook.
I'm surprised Apple doesn't offer an option. On the iPhone you could do this by pressing the power button several times. Not sure if this still works because the iPhone 6 was my last one though.
That's good feedback. I just added it to the readme:
> "PanicLock fills a gap macOS leaves open: there is no built-in way to instantly disable Touch ID when it matters. Biometrics are convenient day-to-day, and sometimes preferable when you need speed or want to avoid your password being observed. But in sensitive situations, law enforcement and border agents in many countries can compel a biometric unlock in ways they cannot with a password. PanicLock gives you a one-click menu bar button, a customizable hotkey, or an automatic lock-on-lid-close option that immediately disables Touch ID and locks your screen, restoring password-only protection without killing your session or shutting down."
I've more details on the apps landing page - paniclock.github.io
A person might use it to stop someone getting into your computer through certain types of physical coercion, forcing your finger to the reader, or (much less likely but I’m sure security services know how) a copy of your fingerprint.
But it isn’t a why, it is a what. That what is a tool that lets you quickly disable Touch ID for whatever reason you want to.
PSA to iOS users: if you tap the lock button 5x it forces password-only unlocking. Useful at protests or any precarious situations with law enforcement.
Correct. This is a classic security vs convenience tradeoff. I mention that trade off on the landing page, PanicLock vs Shutdown
> Use shutdown when you can, PanicLock when you can't. Shutting down is the most secure option—but when you need your Mac locked now and you'll be back in five minutes, PanicLock is your answer.
*PanicLock*
- Fast "oh shit" button
- Lid closed when in transit.
- Instant lock (1 second). Disables Touch ID immediately
- Preserves your session
- Back to work in minutes
*Full Shutdown*
- Maximum security
- Purges encryption keys
- Fully locks FileVault
- Takes time to shutdown & restart
- Kills your session
There should just be a way to setup an alternate dummy account based on the finger you use. This gives the illusion of compliance but your real data is safe.
If you're in a situation where this is a pressing issue, it's not a good solution as it's trivial to detect if it's a fake environment, especially if they get suspicious and run external forensics on it.
iirc the GrapheneOS team won't implement this feature for that reason
Capable? Yes. Willing? I wouldn't be so sure. You don't even need to hurt someone to manhandle them enough to put their fingerprint on a scanner. Whereas forcing someone to give up a password could rise to the level of torture.
Of course, I imagine the majority of people would yield their password if you simply threatened to detain them long enough to make them miss their flight.
Great idea and implementation! If you are hesitant to install this for any reason, you can accomplish the same thing with this one liner:
Edit: here's a shortcut to run the above and then lock your screen. You can give it a global keyboard shortcut in the Shortcuts app. https://www.icloud.com/shortcuts/9362945d839140dbbf987e5bce9...Hook this to a lid angle below 30° trigger in https://lowtechguys.com/crank and you can easily make it run on a simple lowering of the lid
At that point, why not just disable Touch ID?
When the bad guys are too impatient to wait until you leave the computer but not fast enough to stop you before 30 degrees while keeping the convenience of life.
If this were a concern for me the better choice is shutting down the laptop to encrypt the drive and disable biometrics. This does nothing since the drive is still unencrypted.
Neat idea.
I remember way back in the day, there was some question as to the legality of compelled unlocking of devices; IIRC, it’s been deemed legal to compel a fingerprint, but illegal (under the first amendment?) to compel entry of a password—IIRC, as long as that password hasn’t been written down anywhere.
I gather this is written to that end primarily? Or is there some other goal as well?
I wrote this after the case of a Washington Post reporter, Hannah Natanson, was compelled to unlock her computer with her fingerprint. This resulted in access to her Desktop Signal on her computer, revealing sources and their conversations.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/washington-post-raid-pro...
Edit: I've a lot more details about the legality and precedence on the apps landing page https://paniclock.github.io/
(I've put a copy of this text at the top of the thread, since it's standard for Show HNs to have some intro/background up there. I hope that's ok with you!)
Thank you!
Cool, thank you.
There's also the issue that the device is covered in fingerprints, and if you can build a clean image of the print, you can likely manufacture a gelatin copy of that fingerprint that will work on most fingerprint scanners.
I can't speak to the current generation of Apple fingerprint scanners, but historically iirc you can grab a print, clean it up in Photoshop, print it on OHP transparency using a laser printer and use it like a mould to copy a fingerprint.
The website has some more info on the biometric vs. password debate and legal situation:
https://paniclock.github.io/
While it's true that the legality of law enforcement forcing passwords in unclear, courts can absolutely force you to enter a password even if it's not written down by holding you in contempt indefinitely.
>courts can absolutely force you to enter a password even if it's not written down by holding you in contempt indefinitely.
This is not true outside of a narrow exception. Indeed this is the core point of the 5th Amendment, to protect you from having to be witness against yourself. It's just as binding on the judicial branch as it is on the executive. Ordinarily, a court may not compel a defendant to testify or say something that could incriminate them.
The narrow exception is the "foregone conclusion doctrine", which allows compelling testimony about specific evidence the government legally knows exists, knows the defendant controls access to, and knows is authentic. All of which has a bunch of caselaw around it. The textbook example is somebody has a device open, and an officer directly witnesses illegal material on it, but before they can seize it the person manages to turn it off and now it cannot be accessed without a password. So the government can say "we witnessed this specific illegal material, and this device is owned by the defendant and we can prove from video that they have accessed the device, and we want access to that specific material". But if you're just crossing the border with a locked device, they cannot compel the password just to search through it, or even if they're suspicious of something specific. They need actual knowledge, either through their own evidence or because the person foolishly talks and confesses something.
Otherwise they can definitely physically seize the device for a time (which could be very inconvenient/expensive depending) but that's it.
There are lot cases where it is proven that you don't have any legal protection on border crossings.
Take it to the logical end - you can tie up / handcuff / sedate / restrain an individual in order to get their fingerprint (or, ahem, way worse) but you cannot extract a password from someones brain.
If it's in scope to "way worse" someone to get their fingerprint, I'm sure I can be very persuasive in getting their passwords.
You can get the fingerprint of a dead person... you cannot extract a password from a dead person.
Of course not. You extract it right before.
> cannot extract a password from someones brain.
May I introduce you to XKCD Number 538.
https://xkcd.com/538
How beneficial is this versus just being theater? The example used in this is the government accessing the reporters laptop via biometrics.
But in this case, and especially under this admin legal or not this app won't stop them, unless I'm misunderstanding the macOS security model. Even with FDE enabled, sending it to the lock screen with biometrics disabled will not do anything to stop them from being able to access the contents of the hard drive via forensic methods with relative ease.
I think that at best this will only stop the casual person (i.e. a family member or roommate/random snooper)? In which case there would be no point to switch away from biometrics.
You're far better off just keeping more private information on the iPhone and isolating that data from a Mac, since that has far more resistance to intrusion in AFU mode than a Mac.
My interpretation was that it's easier to physically force someone to mash their finger on the sensor than to get them to divulge a password, not that it offers you any kind of legal protection. But yeah, it's a plausible but somewhat contrived situation to find yourself in.
It does offer you legal protection. In the US, the right to not self incriminate protect you from divulging passwords but does not protect you from giving up biometrics. In other countries the rule is different.
This is great. I see many times "security advice" against biometrics replacing password unlock, but most of the time I am more worried about getting recorded by somebody/something while typing a password in the open than anything else. This makes it better for those other cases.
I've thought the Apple platform has two glaring omissions
- touchid and biometric configuration profiles (standard, paranoid, extra paranoid)
- versioning for icloud backup
The simple fact is that there is no one-sized-fits-all use case for this.
Biometrics are great for the average user! They reduce shoulder surfing and increase security.
But for some users, you might want two factor for biometrics (such as an apple watch), or short windows before password entry is forced. You might want both biometrics AND password entry required. You might want to enable biometrics only when two factor is enabled.
Look, I'm not saying that what I've said is the ideal setup, by the way. Just that there is a lot of room for improvement versus the status quo.
At that point what you need is true multi-factor. For example, both fingerprint and per-device PIN.
Regrettably, that's not often offered as a feature, even when the infrastructure is already there.
Notably macOS cannot do this
If you create a piv certificate on a yubikey and just plug it in while logged in, it automatically registers it as a login method.
Careful with absolutist statements :)
macOS can in fact be configured to use a third party idp, including interactive elements, on loginwindow.
So, you could build your own through the ExtensibleSingleSignOn and Extensible Enterprise SSO macOS plugin API. You would do touchid, and then have it pop your own custom window/app, providing a prompt through that API, except it's just a hardcoded value (or some shit idk)
https://youtu.be/ph37Yd1vV-c
So yes, macOS can in fact do that. Just not out of the box. I strongly believe that it is a glaring omission, or at least something they should gate through lockdown mode. idk!
This would be perfect if it could monitor the force with which the lid is closed (macs have accelerometers after all, either this info or an acceptable proxy could be derived?).
Gently close? no action.
Stronger, faster action? Disable touch ID
Slam shut in full panic? yeah disable all biometrics, lose all state, even wipe the ram and the filevault key if it's an option
Perfect rage quitting machine. There should be an enterprise version: when lid is closed with full force it also sends a professional resignation letter to the current employer.
You must not have cats or children if you think that last one is reasonable
Ok just unload the filevault key from ram, better? And if possible tell the secure enclave to revert to the before-first-unlock state
The iOS equivalent is to hold the side + volume button until the power slider shows up. Cancel out of it and the next unlock will require your passcode. Pressing the side button 5x triggers Emergency SOS which does the same thing. Been there forever but barely anyone knows about it.
Nice to see something like this on the Mac side.
Or IMO easier: press the on/off button 5 or more times in rapid succession.
> in sensitive situations, law enforcement and border agents in many countries can compel a biometric unlock in ways they cannot with a password.
If the threat model includes state-level actors, then disabling biometrics won't prevent data from being retrieved from physical memory. It would probably be wiser to enable disk encryption and have a panic button that powers down/hibernates the computer so that no unencrypted data remains on RAM.
The website says shutdown "takes time" and "kills your session" but a hibernation button would take effect just as fast and would preserve the session.
Apple Silicon is at least much more difficult to attack in this way, though it might be possible.
a cop works for "the state," but he's definitely not a "state-level actor."
How do you define "state-level actor?" Police departments certainly have access to state and federal forensic resources to access unencrypted data in memory.
In the context of breaking into phones and laptops, "state-level actor" usually implies a team of people with NSA-type forensic capabilities. That is, they have deep expertise in infosec and related topics, access to 0days that the security apparatus has hoarded and kept secret for their own use, and they may have bespoke hardware to facilitate attacking the device.
A random cop might have access to a Cellebrite machine but they can't just call up the NSA and ask them to break into some drug dealer's macbook.
Fair enough. Though they certainly could still break in if the laptop isn't encrypted, so this tool is only useful when combined with disk encryption.
I'm surprised Apple doesn't offer an option. On the iPhone you could do this by pressing the power button several times. Not sure if this still works because the iPhone 6 was my last one though.
Pressing and holding Power + Vol Up/Down is the current combo
Pressing the power button 5 times fast also does it!
This is awesome, thank you. Was just thinking about this problem the other day. Glad someone whipped something up.
The 2026 version of "Boss Key".
What's the rationale? It should be described in the README.md IMO
That's good feedback. I just added it to the readme:
> "PanicLock fills a gap macOS leaves open: there is no built-in way to instantly disable Touch ID when it matters. Biometrics are convenient day-to-day, and sometimes preferable when you need speed or want to avoid your password being observed. But in sensitive situations, law enforcement and border agents in many countries can compel a biometric unlock in ways they cannot with a password. PanicLock gives you a one-click menu bar button, a customizable hotkey, or an automatic lock-on-lid-close option that immediately disables Touch ID and locks your screen, restoring password-only protection without killing your session or shutting down."
I've more details on the apps landing page - paniclock.github.io
A person might use it to stop someone getting into your computer through certain types of physical coercion, forcing your finger to the reader, or (much less likely but I’m sure security services know how) a copy of your fingerprint.
But it isn’t a why, it is a what. That what is a tool that lets you quickly disable Touch ID for whatever reason you want to.
Honestly I’m surprised this wasn’t already a feature in macOS. Thank you for coding it and publishing as open-source!
This should be an OS X feature, it's just that good.
Great work, congrats!
PSA to iOS users: if you tap the lock button 5x it forces password-only unlocking. Useful at protests or any precarious situations with law enforcement.
This still leaves your device in an AFU (after first unlock) state, with user data decrypted, and should not be treated as secure.
The only thing you can do (to protect your data from forensics, etc) is to return it to BFU by shutting it off.
Correct. This is a classic security vs convenience tradeoff. I mention that trade off on the landing page, PanicLock vs Shutdown
> Use shutdown when you can, PanicLock when you can't. Shutting down is the most secure option—but when you need your Mac locked now and you'll be back in five minutes, PanicLock is your answer.
*PanicLock* - Fast "oh shit" button - Lid closed when in transit. - Instant lock (1 second). Disables Touch ID immediately - Preserves your session - Back to work in minutes
*Full Shutdown* - Maximum security - Purges encryption keys - Fully locks FileVault - Takes time to shutdown & restart - Kills your session
Better than nothing and keeps them from having unlocked access. You can do it fast in your pocket.
Bringing up the shutdown screen (hold lock and either volume button) will also do it.
I did not know that. That is extremely convenient. Thank you.
Tapping it 5 (6? 7? 20?) times works better while panicked, though.
- TSA: Hey, bring your bag and devices here. Routine inspection.
- Traveler: [takes phone from the bin] [finds lock button] [click] [click] [click]
- TSA: Hey, stop what you're doing Mr. Terrorist!
On GrapheneOS (and maybe android generic?) this calls the emergency number, I just found out (with a 5 second timer to cancel this luckily)
There should just be a way to setup an alternate dummy account based on the finger you use. This gives the illusion of compliance but your real data is safe.
If you're in a situation where this is a pressing issue, it's not a good solution as it's trivial to detect if it's a fake environment, especially if they get suspicious and run external forensics on it.
iirc the GrapheneOS team won't implement this feature for that reason
If someone can force you to use touch id they can probably also force you to enter your password.
(If you’re about to comment about fingerprints on transparency film and balloons filled with warm water then yes good point)
Capable? Yes. Willing? I wouldn't be so sure. You don't even need to hurt someone to manhandle them enough to put their fingerprint on a scanner. Whereas forcing someone to give up a password could rise to the level of torture.
Of course, I imagine the majority of people would yield their password if you simply threatened to detain them long enough to make them miss their flight.