I always ask (1) why does an app require installation and (2) why would it require root?
There are valid answers for both, but realistically, all a videoconferencing app should need (apart from audio and video and maybe screen sharing) is to store a config file.
There's no legitimate use for it accessing privileged or private paths.
Out of interest why do you still use the app and not just use it in the browser? I feel much more secure having it in the browser sandbox and everything I care about works in the browser.
Not parent, but the web player used to be a down-graded experience from the native app. If you need Zoom for a professional setting, those functions could be important.
Do not know if this is still true, but at one point, the web player would only let you see one speaker at a time, while the app would show multiple people at once.
I worked at Zoom during this time. That's not what happened.
Zoom used the same technique Cisco Webex did - they ran a webserver with an open port so that local "links" to a meeting could open on your own machine. It wasn't a backdoor. Apple flagged that as a potential security risk, so Zoom worked with Apple on how to safely remove only the webserver without affecting other functionality. We were happy that Apple worked with us on this.
However, I thought it was very interesting (and strange) that there was almost no reaction from the tech community that Apple had software running on every Mac that allowed them to remove any binary they wished. (Which sure sounds like a backdoor)
Apple did block the app so the 'working with Apple' didn't exactly earn Zoom a lot of trust with them otherwise they wouldn't have done it. They'd have let Zoom fix it in an update. And just make that update mandatory. They were just looking out for their own customers in limiting the impact, but for them to pull this handbrake means they really saw this as a big risk.
'But Cisco did it too!' is just whataboutism. It was shown to be exploited (IIRC to open scam websites) which was a real backdoor and a legitimate security risk, not a potential one.
This is something that should never have happened in the first place. Even releasing something like this in the first place is really showing no concern for the security of customers at all. What it looks like to me is that zoom wanted to conquer the market by ease of use and was willing to sacrifice security to do it. The zoombombing thing was another example.
And yes Apple has an emergency brake for malware outbreaks. And they've only used that one for high profile apps once, for zoom. They didn't do that lightly, especially during the pandemic when people were depending on it.
Really I have no good words for the actions of zoom. And there have been more incidents.
I was involved in mitigating these screwups in my work, what we did was flag zoom as malware ourselves so it automatically got removed from every company machine. And block it from being installed by the user. This block is still in place.
Ps I'm sorry if I sound harsh but zoom has caused several security worries at work and we don't even use it.
A whataboutism that makes a legitimate point. It isn't reasonable to dismiss something just because a person makes a comparison. It's valid to consider that Apple might have been applying inconsistent standards and unfairly targeting Zoom for some reason.
I doubt they were being unfair but it is a bad practice to dismiss an argument because someone has the temerity to expect consistent standards. The threat of Apple arbitrarily removing apps based on unreliable reasoning is concerning.
> A few years back, there was something about gaining root on MacOS via Zoom due to shady execution on their end.
> There's no legitimate use for it accessing privileged or private paths.
Well, that was the whole premise that made Zoom popular in the first place! It was a true one click install which made onboarding frictionless for non-technical users
Security wise, it's insane but user experience wise, it was unbeatable and is what solidified their position. It's ironic nowadays that all of those tricks have been stripped away, making it just as painful as any other platform to install on a fresh machine.
> I noticed it because I make heavy use of a "one-shot paste" tool which fulfills a single paste request and then terminates. Handy for filling in lots of fields of a web form – queue up pastes of several different things, then go to each form field in turn and just hit paste, bam bam bam.
This sounds very useful. Is the tool available anywhere? xclip -loops doesn't seem to do the trick, or maybe it just doesn't work that way on Wayland.
I have a few scripts that interact with wl-copy. Like one that just cats all the files in a directory and pipes it into wl-copy so I can paste it somewhere else. Something like that would've been immensly useful when I was still on windows, but that would've been too much a bother to set up.
Just run these things in your browser. Despite the dark design patterns that try to trick you into installing their desktop client, the web-based versions are fine.
if you use Wayland's security context to prohibit privileged protocols such as arbitrary clipboard access then an application will either not be able to grab clipboard content until you focus on it or the attempt will be noticeable as it spawns a short lived window in an attempt to grab focus.
And that is useless if you have meetings with people that "have standardized" on Zoom, and that hold some sort of leverage over you, like clients/customers.
I would rather have a nice popup on first attempt "this application is monitoring your clipboard, allow?", ideally with that process completely suspended while that prompt is up.
This should be behind a toggle driven by intent, rather than something allowed by default. Default stance on trust should be "don't". Open source has nothing to do with it, when a typo while installing with a package manager means you might accidentally install something else (a common attack vector).
Depends on how you use your computer. If you're mostly a developer/analysis terminal jockey with some browsing-- Qubes is a tremendous upgrade even if you don't care at all about the security properties:
The normal qube model of template OS vms + ephemeral app overlays makes it a cinch to troubleshoot complex issues because you can scribble all over the VM (e.g. go ahead, monkey patch your system LIBC if you want!) and all those changes will be gone when you restart the VM. Once you do find a solution you like, you can apply it cleanly and intentionally to the template. If all you were doing was a one-off, then no need to go make it permanent. Not sure if the latest Fedora upgrade is going to break stuff you care about? Install and switch to it one appvm at a time. Something breaks, file a bug and switch that one back until its fixed.
I've had friends screwing around with AI agents get their systems really screwed up because running the agent in a VM was work and requires maintenance. .. in qubes its just the natural way to run it, a few clicks and you're good to go. And the maintenance overhead of running in a VM is mostly non-existent.
If you ever use VPNs for privacy or to access protected networks-- Qubes is a big upgrade: You can run multiple VPN network VMs and then pick on an AppQube by AppQube basis which network they use. Then you don't have to worry about malware from your reddit browsing VM (or your Erotic MLP fanfic) going out over your employer's network or your banking going out via some Norwegian anonmization proxy that might spy on your traffic or cause your bank to instantly block your account. You can accomplish this without qubes but in qubes its particularly easy (and easy to get right): Every VM that has network access has it provided by another VM. Configure the networking how you like in that service VM and then pick what uses it.
When I say 'developer' above I don't mean to suggest that Qubes is particularly hard to use-- as I know significantly less technical people who use it without issue. But its non-security/privacy advantages are most significant if you're doing experimentation with the computer's configuration.
However if you're doing stuff that is Video heavy-- particularly gaming, and to a lesser extent CAD, video editing, etc. Qubes really brutally hurts video performance. It can be somewhat offset by running on higher end hardware (and then getting performance of a few year older system). Even just watching youtube videos is obvious impacted.
Similarly, it dents battery life. This is addressable via additional batteries given that now laptops are usbc powered and 100wh external batteries are readily available. But this is something of a lifestyle question.
Even before the AI-apocalypse I considered qubes to be non-negotiable on laptops-- there are just far far far too many browser RCE vulnerabilities to consider anything less for any computer that isn't a total security write-off.
Previously if I followed a link to a sus site and had my browser crash (maybe even the day before a RCE-in-the-wild was announced). I'd have some rationally justified paranoia that my whole computer might be compromised. Now, I can close the app VM (or-- better-- toss the disposable, which I try to use for most browsing) and know that even if they exploited the browser they'd have to have a VM escape of some kind too to do me any lasting damage.
The highest security stuff still ought to be on isolated hardware, of course. But using a multipurpose computer without qubes is unsafe at any speed, worse than driving without a seatbelt.
I dumped it after realizing Xen does its damndest in preventing you from hiding VM attributes from Guest OSes.
Proxmox uses KVM, and is easy to configure a VM to make the guest think it's on bare metal.
In the proprietary software space, a LOT of things run badly or refuse to run, or license stupidity with a guest OS. So for me, spoofing bare metal is an essential part of running ilk like Windows and proprietary apps. And also, school remote testing garbage.
Srsly, all those neck beards who over simplify the problem with a flippant "don't use zoom", as if everyone has the luxury to skip every job interview and employer meeting that absolutely requires Zoom. I wish I could live in their world where every problem is solved by simply avoiding that problem.
Zoom isn't just a technical problem. It's literally malware. The list of issues they've knowingly caused and sometimes even refused to fix is endless. They have made it clear they absolutely don't care about security in any way and they've built their entire business around that.
As I work in cyber security there's no way I'll install that shit on my personal PC. Yes I could spin up a VM but I don't want to. I could probably use it over the web but that's it.
So I'd refuse and that company's reply should inform me whether I'd want to work there in the first place. If they insist their security practices will be so lax that I will be just spending my time cleaning up everyone else's mess. In fact any employer using zoom in the first place is a huge red flag.
I currently work for a huge multinational and they have the zoom client blocked through antimalware. Anyone wishing to use it with customers or suppliers must use the web version only.
Just use a browser instead of some silly client, problem mostly solved. Use X11 or Wayland or whatever else you want, for God's sake. I don't remember any god ever claiming salvation lies in abandoning the most functional display server on the market so I'll just keep on using X11. If and when Wayland or some other alternative ever becomes as useful as X11 I might hop over but for now Wayland is a solution in search of a problem as far as I'm concerned.
It takes experience to learn why people call it the "bleeding edge". GPU acceleration is often broken in a lot of distros, and it is unkind to new users that have a panic attack dropping into a CLI shell.
LightDM at least works 99% of the time, being Cross-desktop one can select a Wayland session just fine (great when it is working), or fall back to a software compositor Cinnamon Desktop when things bork after an update. =3
Fine words, until the GPU driver goes sideways in Wayland. And... I like running multi-seat headless sessions on my local LAN hosts for several reasons. =3
This is a habit tech people fall into. "Amazon deleted my book" -> well just strip the DRM off it. "My ISP monitors me" -> well just use a VPN instead. "Ads make it hard to use the internet" -> well just use an ad blocker.
Ironically if more tech people just rawdogged the internet I think we would have more progress.
My partial solution is to have the Android Zoom client on an idle tablet. Even though it is my office VOIP phone too, I power it off when I don't have meetings scheduled.
If someone tries to demand screen sharing, I ask one of my coworkers to drive, since they've joined from their laptop already.
I only launch the Linux Zoom client when I absolutely know I'm going to need to host a meeting and demonstrate software running on my end. I feel equally disgusted about Zoom and the corporate EDR agent. I basically feel like the most likely source of compromise of my laptop is these proprietary tools forced on me from above.
The thing that worries me is SSO for work. I wish there was a completely different identity for all the work-related apps and for my payroll/benefits portal. I.e. if they want to endanger my login that manages my work product, fine, but I don't appreciate them endangering my login that manages my own compensation, tax deductions and retirement transfers, and health insurance...
If we are doing a survey of self hosted video conferencing services I would like to propose galene. Very easy to set up, I run it on obsd(an unsupported platform) and it just works.
Perhaps things have gotten better over time, but I did this 4 or 5 years ago and it was anything but trivial. I got it working, but it was a huge pain to set up.
The docker image build recipes should be easy to find these days.
Usually it is just local networking appliance rules that cause issues for some users. Likely a great learning experience for the uninitiated. Have a great day =3
Zoom also works on all browsers. Clearly you had a hot take, people corrected you, and now you're doubling down by suggesting, of all things, a Google product.
There is no such thing as an "X11 clipboard" that something can be written to. As the poster goes on to allude, X11 has a concept of a "selection" (a primary and a secondary one).
It goes roughly like this: when you select a text in a window, the X client tells the X server "I have the selection now", when you paste in another window, the client behind the other window asks "who has the selection?" and requests the selection contents from the other client, the data is then forwarded through the server. The client that claimed ownership has to properly handle some associated requests/events for the whole thing to work.
The key point is, there is no central "clipboard" style repository like on Windows, the client that does the "copy" is responsible for the data, the client that wants to "paste" has to talk to it. If I try to copy/paste and quit the source program before the paste, the data is gone. That's why modern desktop environments usually come with a dedicated daemon that immediately reacts to selection ownership changes, grabs the data for itself and then claims the selection ownership to emulate the Windows style behavior.
If we play devils advocate, it's possible the Zoom client tries to do just that, not trusting whatever desktop environment. I don't use this software, so I'm going out on a limb here, but I'd guess that the "Zoom Desktop Client" is just another browser in disguise? It might be actually Chromium or whatever underneath that does this?
It's not chromium. But what's happening here is that even if you don't click paste, zoom is actively listening to clipboard events and consuming pastes.
Tbh, if they aren't harvesting clipbakrds data which is a weird thing to do and is unlikely, this doesn't really mean much. Anyways any X client can read.
I suspect it's something like: a bug report that said that I copied the link but when I opened zoom and pasted it it didn't it work. I.e, they probably closed the source application and thus the selection owner is gone, and the selection is gone too. This fixes that. I would test that maybe. See if paste after source app close works. Then again, if you use a ownership changing clipboard manager this shudnt be a problem.
Linux generally presumes that you run trusted software, not some proprietary program that is approximately malware. If you want a "sandbox" run that program as a separate unprivileged user or use bubblewrap.
Thankfully iOS rolled out a permissions prompt for this. Pretty illuminating just how often other apps read the clipboard, e.g. Google Maps reading my clipboard every time I tapped on the text field to search for a destination.
The "clipboard" as it is implemented in many (most?) operating systems today, only exists because it's a legacy idea that hasn't died. If it were freshly invented today, it would never get past even the most lenient privacy review.
Think about the pitch for the feature: "So, we're going to make this in the OS, where the user can highlight anything in any application, invoke a command, and then that thing (which could be a sensitive password, private personal information, or the codes to a nuclear weapon) will instantly become available for all applications on the system to read and do anything with. Uhh... NO THANKS!
Ideally, if an application wants to read from the clipboard, it should explicitly ask the user for permission, or the user should have to specify the exact app he's copy/pasting to. This reduces the clipboard's ease of use, but at least makes it NOT a truck sized privacy hole.
No. You're assuming that you don't have control of your own computer.
Think about the pitch for removing the feature, "So, we're going to make this in the OS, where visually disabled users cannot highlight anything in any application, can't move text between applications, cannot get the window title, cannot get the window tree, cannot have applications automate or know where other applications are, and basically they won't be able to use their computers. But everyting will be super private. Even the human using the computer won't be able to read it." This is what modern linux desktop computer is on waylands thanks to this toxic privacy meme. It literally just doesn't work for me.
Privacy needs the kind you're talking about simply don't exist on desktop computers where the human actually controls everything (as opposed to smartphone model where the user controls very little and applications are hostile and opaque). If you want to break accessibility and functioning of smartphones, fine, go for it. But leave desktop computers alone.
Unfortunately, we are living in a world where we need to treat every third party application that we run (and in some cases, even the operating system itself) as a hostile attacker.
Gone are the days when you could download a software, run it, and trust that the developer isn't transmitting everything on your system back to their servers. Developers have poisoned the well and repeatedly demonstrated that they will run roughshod over the user's system, send telemetry back about everything the user is doing, enroll them in A/B experiments they didn't ask for, and take advantage of every resource, every peripheral and device, and every bit of personal information they can get their hands on.
Unless you are 100% running open source software that you have personally vetted, or that you trust that the package manager / maintainer has sufficiently vetted, you can't copy a password into the clipboard with any kind of confidence that other apps aren't sneaking a peek.
Let's assume I have control of my own computer. On this computer with Linux and X11, how do I restrict programs (such as Zoom client) from accessing the clipboard?
What are you going on about? Why shouldn't there be some temporary authorization prompt for clipboard access? You could even wire it up to control-V somehow such that the same keystroke would grant temporary access and communicate a paste to the application. Nobody is talking about making the clipboard unusable.
Not the first time Zoom abuses privilege.
A few years back, there was something about gaining root on MacOS via Zoom due to shady execution on their end.
They've lost my trust since then, and I'll only run it sandboxed: https://gist.github.com/cielavenir/02f322e322a2a3555dbf2b38f...
I always ask (1) why does an app require installation and (2) why would it require root?
There are valid answers for both, but realistically, all a videoconferencing app should need (apart from audio and video and maybe screen sharing) is to store a config file.
There's no legitimate use for it accessing privileged or private paths.
Out of interest why do you still use the app and not just use it in the browser? I feel much more secure having it in the browser sandbox and everything I care about works in the browser.
Not parent, but the web player used to be a down-graded experience from the native app. If you need Zoom for a professional setting, those functions could be important.
Do not know if this is still true, but at one point, the web player would only let you see one speaker at a time, while the app would show multiple people at once.
99% of the time I use the browser.
However, the video quality in the browser is worse, so depending on the use case I might have to use the app (via sandbox).
It's been years since I've had to though.
Yes Apple even blocked their app because they refused to fix it. Eventually they did and unfortunately they were allowed again.
It wasn't really root as much as an open backdoor on a TCP port as far as I recall.
I worked at Zoom during this time. That's not what happened.
Zoom used the same technique Cisco Webex did - they ran a webserver with an open port so that local "links" to a meeting could open on your own machine. It wasn't a backdoor. Apple flagged that as a potential security risk, so Zoom worked with Apple on how to safely remove only the webserver without affecting other functionality. We were happy that Apple worked with us on this.
However, I thought it was very interesting (and strange) that there was almost no reaction from the tech community that Apple had software running on every Mac that allowed them to remove any binary they wished. (Which sure sounds like a backdoor)
Apple did block the app so the 'working with Apple' didn't exactly earn Zoom a lot of trust with them otherwise they wouldn't have done it. They'd have let Zoom fix it in an update. And just make that update mandatory. They were just looking out for their own customers in limiting the impact, but for them to pull this handbrake means they really saw this as a big risk.
'But Cisco did it too!' is just whataboutism. It was shown to be exploited (IIRC to open scam websites) which was a real backdoor and a legitimate security risk, not a potential one.
This is something that should never have happened in the first place. Even releasing something like this in the first place is really showing no concern for the security of customers at all. What it looks like to me is that zoom wanted to conquer the market by ease of use and was willing to sacrifice security to do it. The zoombombing thing was another example.
And yes Apple has an emergency brake for malware outbreaks. And they've only used that one for high profile apps once, for zoom. They didn't do that lightly, especially during the pandemic when people were depending on it.
Really I have no good words for the actions of zoom. And there have been more incidents.
I was involved in mitigating these screwups in my work, what we did was flag zoom as malware ourselves so it automatically got removed from every company machine. And block it from being installed by the user. This block is still in place.
Ps I'm sorry if I sound harsh but zoom has caused several security worries at work and we don't even use it.
> 'But Cisco did it too!' is just whataboutism.
A whataboutism that makes a legitimate point. It isn't reasonable to dismiss something just because a person makes a comparison. It's valid to consider that Apple might have been applying inconsistent standards and unfairly targeting Zoom for some reason.
I doubt they were being unfair but it is a bad practice to dismiss an argument because someone has the temerity to expect consistent standards. The threat of Apple arbitrarily removing apps based on unreliable reasoning is concerning.
Cisco's one wasn't shown to be exploited though. Even after the news about the zoom one. They must have done something different.
But my point is that this should never have made it into an enterprise level product, even if someone else did it.
> A few years back, there was something about gaining root on MacOS via Zoom due to shady execution on their end.
> There's no legitimate use for it accessing privileged or private paths.
Well, that was the whole premise that made Zoom popular in the first place! It was a true one click install which made onboarding frictionless for non-technical users
Security wise, it's insane but user experience wise, it was unbeatable and is what solidified their position. It's ironic nowadays that all of those tricks have been stripped away, making it just as painful as any other platform to install on a fresh machine.
Unrelated to Zoom, but
> I noticed it because I make heavy use of a "one-shot paste" tool which fulfills a single paste request and then terminates. Handy for filling in lots of fields of a web form – queue up pastes of several different things, then go to each form field in turn and just hit paste, bam bam bam.
This sounds very useful. Is the tool available anywhere? xclip -loops doesn't seem to do the trick, or maybe it just doesn't work that way on Wayland.
Turns out, Wayland has wl-copy:
https://man.archlinux.org/man/wl-copy.1
(i was also interested :)
I have a few scripts that interact with wl-copy. Like one that just cats all the files in a directory and pipes it into wl-copy so I can paste it somewhere else. Something like that would've been immensly useful when I was still on windows, but that would've been too much a bother to set up.
Just run these things in your browser. Despite the dark design patterns that try to trick you into installing their desktop client, the web-based versions are fine.
with Wayland it's generally not any safer.
if you use Wayland's security context to prohibit privileged protocols such as arbitrary clipboard access then an application will either not be able to grab clipboard content until you focus on it or the attempt will be noticeable as it spawns a short lived window in an attempt to grab focus.
https://jitsi.org/
Jitsi is an excellent free and open source alternative.
And that is useless if you have meetings with people that "have standardized" on Zoom, and that hold some sort of leverage over you, like clients/customers.
Why I always shutdown the zoom process as soon as meetings end.
I miss ordinary conference calling being the norm. I like having a desktop IP phone.
Feeling good about using Zoom, when necessary, in a tab in ChromeOS. Zoom is "Not allowed to see your clipboard" in Chrome preferences.
Reason 1492835 to use Qubes OS.
Also reason 35892384242892 to not use proprietary software, especially proprietary software with network access.
Par for the course when running a proprietary application. If doing that on Linux, can you imagine what it and others do under Windows ?
As people running Linux should know, you cannot trust proprietary applications.
I would rather have a nice popup on first attempt "this application is monitoring your clipboard, allow?", ideally with that process completely suspended while that prompt is up.
This should be behind a toggle driven by intent, rather than something allowed by default. Default stance on trust should be "don't". Open source has nothing to do with it, when a typo while installing with a package manager means you might accidentally install something else (a common attack vector).
Qubes OS saved me, once again. On it, Zoom only has the access to an empty VM and no access to the clipboard.
What's it like using Qubes? How much friction? I wish I could use some Nix-flavored variant of the sandboxing.
Depends on how you use your computer. If you're mostly a developer/analysis terminal jockey with some browsing-- Qubes is a tremendous upgrade even if you don't care at all about the security properties:
The normal qube model of template OS vms + ephemeral app overlays makes it a cinch to troubleshoot complex issues because you can scribble all over the VM (e.g. go ahead, monkey patch your system LIBC if you want!) and all those changes will be gone when you restart the VM. Once you do find a solution you like, you can apply it cleanly and intentionally to the template. If all you were doing was a one-off, then no need to go make it permanent. Not sure if the latest Fedora upgrade is going to break stuff you care about? Install and switch to it one appvm at a time. Something breaks, file a bug and switch that one back until its fixed.
I've had friends screwing around with AI agents get their systems really screwed up because running the agent in a VM was work and requires maintenance. .. in qubes its just the natural way to run it, a few clicks and you're good to go. And the maintenance overhead of running in a VM is mostly non-existent.
If you ever use VPNs for privacy or to access protected networks-- Qubes is a big upgrade: You can run multiple VPN network VMs and then pick on an AppQube by AppQube basis which network they use. Then you don't have to worry about malware from your reddit browsing VM (or your Erotic MLP fanfic) going out over your employer's network or your banking going out via some Norwegian anonmization proxy that might spy on your traffic or cause your bank to instantly block your account. You can accomplish this without qubes but in qubes its particularly easy (and easy to get right): Every VM that has network access has it provided by another VM. Configure the networking how you like in that service VM and then pick what uses it.
When I say 'developer' above I don't mean to suggest that Qubes is particularly hard to use-- as I know significantly less technical people who use it without issue. But its non-security/privacy advantages are most significant if you're doing experimentation with the computer's configuration.
However if you're doing stuff that is Video heavy-- particularly gaming, and to a lesser extent CAD, video editing, etc. Qubes really brutally hurts video performance. It can be somewhat offset by running on higher end hardware (and then getting performance of a few year older system). Even just watching youtube videos is obvious impacted.
Similarly, it dents battery life. This is addressable via additional batteries given that now laptops are usbc powered and 100wh external batteries are readily available. But this is something of a lifestyle question.
Even before the AI-apocalypse I considered qubes to be non-negotiable on laptops-- there are just far far far too many browser RCE vulnerabilities to consider anything less for any computer that isn't a total security write-off.
Previously if I followed a link to a sus site and had my browser crash (maybe even the day before a RCE-in-the-wild was announced). I'd have some rationally justified paranoia that my whole computer might be compromised. Now, I can close the app VM (or-- better-- toss the disposable, which I try to use for most browsing) and know that even if they exploited the browser they'd have to have a VM escape of some kind too to do me any lasting damage.
The highest security stuff still ought to be on isolated hardware, of course. But using a multipurpose computer without qubes is unsafe at any speed, worse than driving without a seatbelt.
I dumped it after realizing Xen does its damndest in preventing you from hiding VM attributes from Guest OSes.
Proxmox uses KVM, and is easy to configure a VM to make the guest think it's on bare metal.
In the proprietary software space, a LOT of things run badly or refuse to run, or license stupidity with a guest OS. So for me, spoofing bare metal is an essential part of running ilk like Windows and proprietary apps. And also, school remote testing garbage.
Doesn't that preclude paravirtualization drivers? Seems like a major tradeoff for daily driver desktop stuff.
Related Issue with discussion: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1142
Just not using that piece of trash that is zoom would work very well too in this case
In the last couple of years, my only contact with Zoom is the scam webinar invitations from month old domains.
At this point I probably wouldn’t realize a legitimate Zoom meeting was legitimate.
That's bad news. Don't use Zoom.
That's wildly impractical advice for many.
Just use Firefox, or Chromium if you must.
Spinning up a conference host for a small office is fairly trivial =3
https://jitsi.org/downloads/
Great, til I have a job interview and they use Zoom
Spin up your own instance and ask them to join!
Great idea, if you want to stay unemployed.
How many corpo HR/recruiter types you met that will gladly bypass company policy and switch to the tools demanded by the candidate?
Srsly, all those neck beards who over simplify the problem with a flippant "don't use zoom", as if everyone has the luxury to skip every job interview and employer meeting that absolutely requires Zoom. I wish I could live in their world where every problem is solved by simply avoiding that problem.
Zoom isn't just a technical problem. It's literally malware. The list of issues they've knowingly caused and sometimes even refused to fix is endless. They have made it clear they absolutely don't care about security in any way and they've built their entire business around that.
As I work in cyber security there's no way I'll install that shit on my personal PC. Yes I could spin up a VM but I don't want to. I could probably use it over the web but that's it.
So I'd refuse and that company's reply should inform me whether I'd want to work there in the first place. If they insist their security practices will be so lax that I will be just spending my time cleaning up everyone else's mess. In fact any employer using zoom in the first place is a huge red flag.
I currently work for a huge multinational and they have the zoom client blocked through antimalware. Anyone wishing to use it with customers or suppliers must use the web version only.
Use a dedicated, otherwise empty account for job interviews.
Linux is multi-process, _multi-user_ since forever.
No need to leave a password manager, online banking, andwhatnot accessible in the background during an interview.
And yeah: stop. using. X11. For God's sake!
Wayland doesn't work stable in kde on my OS yet so I have no choice but to use X11.
However software just shouldn't be trash. No need to blame the display layer for this.
Just use a browser instead of some silly client, problem mostly solved. Use X11 or Wayland or whatever else you want, for God's sake. I don't remember any god ever claiming salvation lies in abandoning the most functional display server on the market so I'll just keep on using X11. If and when Wayland or some other alternative ever becomes as useful as X11 I might hop over but for now Wayland is a solution in search of a problem as far as I'm concerned.
It takes experience to learn why people call it the "bleeding edge". GPU acceleration is often broken in a lot of distros, and it is unkind to new users that have a panic attack dropping into a CLI shell.
LightDM at least works 99% of the time, being Cross-desktop one can select a Wayland session just fine (great when it is working), or fall back to a software compositor Cinnamon Desktop when things bork after an update. =3
>And yeah: stop. using. X11.
Fine words, until the GPU driver goes sideways in Wayland. And... I like running multi-seat headless sessions on my local LAN hosts for several reasons. =3
This is a habit tech people fall into. "Amazon deleted my book" -> well just strip the DRM off it. "My ISP monitors me" -> well just use a VPN instead. "Ads make it hard to use the internet" -> well just use an ad blocker.
Ironically if more tech people just rawdogged the internet I think we would have more progress.
Unfortunately, experience teaches people one can't affect political policy with gadgets, or deny human nature. =3
https://harmful.cat-v.org/people/basic-laws-of-human-stupidi...
My partial solution is to have the Android Zoom client on an idle tablet. Even though it is my office VOIP phone too, I power it off when I don't have meetings scheduled.
If someone tries to demand screen sharing, I ask one of my coworkers to drive, since they've joined from their laptop already.
I only launch the Linux Zoom client when I absolutely know I'm going to need to host a meeting and demonstrate software running on my end. I feel equally disgusted about Zoom and the corporate EDR agent. I basically feel like the most likely source of compromise of my laptop is these proprietary tools forced on me from above.
The thing that worries me is SSO for work. I wish there was a completely different identity for all the work-related apps and for my payroll/benefits portal. I.e. if they want to endanger my login that manages my work product, fine, but I don't appreciate them endangering my login that manages my own compensation, tax deductions and retirement transfers, and health insurance...
If we are doing a survey of self hosted video conferencing services I would like to propose galene. Very easy to set up, I run it on obsd(an unsupported platform) and it just works.
https://galene.org/
Very nice option, as getting WebRTC built on pi/aarch64 with v4l camera hardware codec support was a slog through mud a few years back. =3
Perhaps things have gotten better over time, but I did this 4 or 5 years ago and it was anything but trivial. I got it working, but it was a huge pain to set up.
The docker image build recipes should be easy to find these days.
Usually it is just local networking appliance rules that cause issues for some users. Likely a great learning experience for the uninitiated. Have a great day =3
Ah yes Jitsi! I have been invited to meet on Jitsi 0 times.
Or just use Google Meet on all browsers, which is more practical to use than Zoom.
Zero software to install.
Zoom also works on all browsers. Clearly you had a hot take, people corrected you, and now you're doubling down by suggesting, of all things, a Google product.
To be fair, you have to wrangle it into submission by having the app launch fail.
There is no such thing as an "X11 clipboard" that something can be written to. As the poster goes on to allude, X11 has a concept of a "selection" (a primary and a secondary one).
It goes roughly like this: when you select a text in a window, the X client tells the X server "I have the selection now", when you paste in another window, the client behind the other window asks "who has the selection?" and requests the selection contents from the other client, the data is then forwarded through the server. The client that claimed ownership has to properly handle some associated requests/events for the whole thing to work.
The key point is, there is no central "clipboard" style repository like on Windows, the client that does the "copy" is responsible for the data, the client that wants to "paste" has to talk to it. If I try to copy/paste and quit the source program before the paste, the data is gone. That's why modern desktop environments usually come with a dedicated daemon that immediately reacts to selection ownership changes, grabs the data for itself and then claims the selection ownership to emulate the Windows style behavior.
If we play devils advocate, it's possible the Zoom client tries to do just that, not trusting whatever desktop environment. I don't use this software, so I'm going out on a limb here, but I'd guess that the "Zoom Desktop Client" is just another browser in disguise? It might be actually Chromium or whatever underneath that does this?
It's not chromium. But what's happening here is that even if you don't click paste, zoom is actively listening to clipboard events and consuming pastes.
Tbh, if they aren't harvesting clipbakrds data which is a weird thing to do and is unlikely, this doesn't really mean much. Anyways any X client can read.
I suspect it's something like: a bug report that said that I copied the link but when I opened zoom and pasted it it didn't it work. I.e, they probably closed the source application and thus the selection owner is gone, and the selection is gone too. This fixes that. I would test that maybe. See if paste after source app close works. Then again, if you use a ownership changing clipboard manager this shudnt be a problem.
I'm not surprised by news like this anymore. When will Linux distributions properly sandbox our applications?
Our phones have had a better permission system for years.
Linux generally presumes that you run trusted software, not some proprietary program that is approximately malware. If you want a "sandbox" run that program as a separate unprivileged user or use bubblewrap.
Android allows apps to read from the clipboard at will, though it does show a toast. GrapheneOS, I believe, asks for permission first.
Thankfully iOS rolled out a permissions prompt for this. Pretty illuminating just how often other apps read the clipboard, e.g. Google Maps reading my clipboard every time I tapped on the text field to search for a destination.
The "clipboard" as it is implemented in many (most?) operating systems today, only exists because it's a legacy idea that hasn't died. If it were freshly invented today, it would never get past even the most lenient privacy review.
Think about the pitch for the feature: "So, we're going to make this in the OS, where the user can highlight anything in any application, invoke a command, and then that thing (which could be a sensitive password, private personal information, or the codes to a nuclear weapon) will instantly become available for all applications on the system to read and do anything with. Uhh... NO THANKS!
Ideally, if an application wants to read from the clipboard, it should explicitly ask the user for permission, or the user should have to specify the exact app he's copy/pasting to. This reduces the clipboard's ease of use, but at least makes it NOT a truck sized privacy hole.
No. You're assuming that you don't have control of your own computer.
Think about the pitch for removing the feature, "So, we're going to make this in the OS, where visually disabled users cannot highlight anything in any application, can't move text between applications, cannot get the window title, cannot get the window tree, cannot have applications automate or know where other applications are, and basically they won't be able to use their computers. But everyting will be super private. Even the human using the computer won't be able to read it." This is what modern linux desktop computer is on waylands thanks to this toxic privacy meme. It literally just doesn't work for me.
Privacy needs the kind you're talking about simply don't exist on desktop computers where the human actually controls everything (as opposed to smartphone model where the user controls very little and applications are hostile and opaque). If you want to break accessibility and functioning of smartphones, fine, go for it. But leave desktop computers alone.
Unfortunately, we are living in a world where we need to treat every third party application that we run (and in some cases, even the operating system itself) as a hostile attacker.
Gone are the days when you could download a software, run it, and trust that the developer isn't transmitting everything on your system back to their servers. Developers have poisoned the well and repeatedly demonstrated that they will run roughshod over the user's system, send telemetry back about everything the user is doing, enroll them in A/B experiments they didn't ask for, and take advantage of every resource, every peripheral and device, and every bit of personal information they can get their hands on.
Unless you are 100% running open source software that you have personally vetted, or that you trust that the package manager / maintainer has sufficiently vetted, you can't copy a password into the clipboard with any kind of confidence that other apps aren't sneaking a peek.
Let's assume I have control of my own computer. On this computer with Linux and X11, how do I restrict programs (such as Zoom client) from accessing the clipboard?
What are you going on about? Why shouldn't there be some temporary authorization prompt for clipboard access? You could even wire it up to control-V somehow such that the same keystroke would grant temporary access and communicate a paste to the application. Nobody is talking about making the clipboard unusable.