This book is fantastic. Highly recommended if you have any interest in how the stored program computer came to be. The Dyson name apparently led to unrivaled access to first-hand accounts.
> Budapest around 1900 produced an absurd cluster of minds: von Neumann, Eugene Wigner, Edward Teller, Leo Szilard, Paul Erdős, Theodore von Kármán, George Pólya.
Not to mention Nikola Tesla about 20 years prior.
> When several of them turned up at Los Alamos and realized they had gone to high school together, Szilard joked that Hungary was a cover story for a Martian landing.
What if there actually are people who go to Mars in the future but regret it and the only way for them to come back to Earth is to invent a time machine and be reborn as a mathematical supergenius. That would explain this at least:
> At six, Janos (the OG hungarian name for Johnny) could divide eight-digit numbers in his head and hold a conversation in ancient Greek. He later added Latin, French, German, English, and Yiddish. The rumor was that he remembered everything he ever read. Many years later Herman Goldstine decided to test this by asking him to recite "A Tale of Two Cities." Von Neumann started on chapter one and had to be asked to stop fifteen minutes later.
I remarked to myself how much the speaker sounded like Ren Hoëk, from The Ren and Stimpy Show. Then I looked up the name of the channel host: Károly Zsolnai-Fehér.
I thought to myself: Huh. Hungarian. That explains the mathematical prowess—and the voice. (Ren's voice is a pastiche of Hungarian actor Peter Lorre.)
It's worth keeping in mind in the 1900s the bar for novelty was much lower. Today you'd have to learn vastly more to even stand a chance of making a single contribution , let alone as many as he had done.
That's true at the beginning of a new field. I'm noted for some advances in network architecture. But when I did that, everybody working on the Internet could meet in one large classroom.
If you were reasonably good, you could make major progress.
Computer science used to be tiny. In the late 1970s, AI was a few tens of people at MIT, at Stanford, and at CMU, with a few smaller groups elsewhere. I met about half the greats of my generation, as did everyone else who was serious.
There were almost no textbooks in the early 1970s. When Knuth's Fundamental Algorithms came out, it was great to finally see what had previously been folklore on mimeographed sheets in an actual book.
I was involved with Autodesk in its very early days. Even went to the founding meeting. The feeling was that PCs were finally getting big enough to be interesting. The founders were all mainframe programmers, and the people who came up from 4K memory on an 8088 had no idea how to organize a big program. But mainframe people did.
There was a vast emptyness in the product space ready to be filled. Products considered were a window manager ("AutoScreen"), a text editor (Kern Sibbald actually built that), a database, and a CAD program. None of those existed yet as successful products.
CAD was picked because the productivity gain was so huge vs. paper and pencil drafting. At the time, the state of the art in drawing editing was drawing on mylar and using an electric eraser to delete. Then you ran the Mylar master through a big copier to make blueprints or whiteprints.
A CAD system on a PC was a very easy sell.
So all you had to do was make it work. No need to overcome the noise level of a thousand similar "apps".
I recently read 'Maniac' by Benjamin Labatut, which also tracks the life of Johnny von Neumann. It is a wonderful read - very eloquently put together, giving accounts of the man from the perspectives of several people in his life.
Not only does it capture the alien-like genius of the protagonist, but also described his particular emotional and social character in a way that I have not seen written elsewhere. Highly recommended.
Seconding this. Maniac is a beautifully written book about von Neumann. It also led me to Benjamin Labatut's When We Cease to Understand the World, another great read.
I looked at the description and this part: "Braiding fact with fiction, Benjamín Labatut takes us on a journey to the frontiers of rational thought" - gave me pause. The Braiding fact with fiction part. Are there clear demarcations between fact and fiction?
I read The man From the Future a few years ago, and I highly recommend it!
John von Neumann was such a fascinating and influential character. If you are interested in the modern history of mathematics, computers, game theory and more, pick up a copy.
Any cognitive scientists here, or actual people with eidetic memory, who can comment how the brain would store everything you ever read or heard and how it can be recalled? What does it feel like to be able to recall and recite the entire text of a Tale of Two Cities?
That's sadly impossible, because the brain, as a limited number of cells, cannot store infite data. The problem lies in the people observing them, but you have some fun mechanisms (and a few of the commonly known fallacies and biases) at work here, that can all contribute to that perceived effect/illusion. Consider the following ideas:
- people can be slightly better than a given random observer, because they learned and prioritise to pay attention. They are better at recalling memorable and minor details, especially in short term memory and in memorable situations that a lot of people share long term. They will still forget long term information that is irrelevant.
- any such person and also observer can easily talk themselves into the belief that their skill must be absolute, especially since the observer will largely only test from his own inferior dataset.
- once the belief takes hold (because people love a good story), observers tend to look less for flaws and more for further confirmations to keep mythologising people.
I would imagine that such people stay off opine and commentary style forums because their instant capacity to recall authoritative sources makes wrongful and derivative discussion tedious. To some extent, with the speed of LLM search and recovery today, we might all be heading that way. Indeed, interesting HN traffic of late appears to have waned. No doubt someone will say I'm hallucinating and all's normal. No, I'm not hallucinating.
It ebbs and flows. It’s actually quite fun to watch. When an interesting article pops up, inevitably a series of echos rise to the front page in the form of subjects corresponding to the various Wikipedia links one would need to fully understand a particular article, or sometimes just tangents that come up.
What beautiful writing. I had no idea JVN did so many things..
"Can we survive technology?" got me thinking about our industry's upheaval. Software engineering's receiving the disruption it so proudly inflicted on other industries.. not reaping what it sowed; rather just the natural order of things.
Acceptance and moving with change is all that can work. Obstructing; denying; ignoring progress.. you'll lose your edge, your relevance, your value to others, and your job. Progress won't wait for us to like it. We must move fast enough to survive change.
Junior engineers for example? Suddenly too junior to be hired? Great! They, and you, can access multiple answer boxes with every PhD ever, and with a bit of creativity, they can leverage that. The best will survive on their own - the rest we should help along. Let's create tools and structures and institutions and help junior engineers finish their education to marketable levels. Let's help them find efficiencies and get there in the same duration. We shouldn't compel companies to preserve a hiring pipeline; now should we incrementally upgrade university educations. Better to go to kids in schools & universities and stimulate their creativity, get them using new tools in new ways, finding efficiencies - because that's what today and tomorrow's jobs will be about. Institutions will adopt the good ideas in time.
We have a responsibility to invest in - and invent - ways of bringing people along.
Big fan of VnM theorem, which this article alludes to in passing. I think it asks a really great question: "can we make good decisions under uncertainty?" And the answer turns out to be "Yes" with some caveats.
He advocated an immediate preemptive nuclear strike on the USSR: "If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at five o'clock, I say why not one o'clock?"
This is why he was dismissed in so far as foreign policy was concerned, where nuance and patience takes precedence over cold, calculating game theory. Not only would it not have been feasible (Russia is huge), but it would have led to follow on effects by possibly pulling the US into potentially another world war. This is evidence you can be a genius in some areas and wrong in others.
That quote doesn't sound like advocacy of an immediate strike to me. That "if" is massive, and going into the details of why you're not already attacking is very likely to give you reasons that keep making you not attack.
Maybe there's some context that suggests otherwise?
I suspect some of these anecdotes are false, 15 mins of tale of two cities, 8 digit division in your head?
This gives a sense of embellishment by a clueless layman who think very smart people can memorize every single thing they ever do. Computers memorize well, very smart humans, it’s not clear if they memorize any better than a man of the street. I was struck by a fields medalist recent comment that he sometimes struggle remembering proofs he wrote himself in the past.
Memorizing books is absolutely possible. A great book about it is Moonwalking with Einstein (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moonwalking_with_Einstein), written by a journalist who was a skeptic but ended becoming a competitive mnemonicist himself. Some people intuitively learn the techniques early in life, and for some of them it becomes a habit.
Same thing applies to mental arithmetic. There are techniques for doing this. IIRC, ironically there's a famous case of someone who claimed to have memorized some hundreds of thousands digits of Pi but was suspected of using mental arithmetic techniques when reciting them.
Still, your point stands. People do embellish these kinds of stories based on stereotypes. It's certainly possible, but any particular anecdote may still be suspect.
Actors routinely memorize whole plays, so it is not implausible for someone to have memorized 15 min of A Tale of Two Cities.
The claim in the article is he remembered everything he read perfectly, which is wild. But another source claim he specifically memorized the Dickens book to train his English, which sounds more likely.
I instantly lose respect to any man that "drove crowded roads like a maniac, and got bored and slowed down on open ones. He wrecked a car roughly every year"
Clearly, there is a reason Von Neumann spent so much time on this 'zero-sum' formulation of the problem, specifically in economics. Clearly he must have believed this was representative to a significant extent, especially given his interest in pragmatic problems.
It would make no sense for an intelligent person to work on an economics problem which doesn't model reality.
> Johnny remained a game theorist to the end. After a lifetime of culturally Jewish atheism, he asked to be baptized. His daughter attributed it to Pascal's Wager: a small probability of a much better afterlife, against a trivial cost.
People always leave off the second half of Pascal's Wager. Pascal's Wager is not simply that you can map out the odds vs risk and decide being a theist is more practical. But rather that if you take the odds, decide to be a theist, then start acting like one (participating in rituals, living like one, practicing what is preached, etc) then you may find God through those actions.
It's important to recall that an all-knowing God isn't necessarily very compassionate, or even rational. Some of the people I've known who knew the most have been the biggest assholes. Or insane.
What if there's a god, but he punishes humans for believing he exists, just for fun? Where's your wager now?
> What if there's a god, but he punishes humans for believing he exists, just for fun? Where's your wager now?
That's the equivalent of Russell's teapot - an imagined, unfalsifiable proposition.
But Pascal's wager was anchored to specific attested propositions: specifically, the gospel of Jesus (repent of sin and call to him, he's paid for it and will save you from judgment and eternal separation from God if you do) rooted in the historical events of his verbal claim to be the son of God, followed by his death and resurrection, witnessed by many. You may agree or disagree, but what you are affirming or denying is at least concrete and specific.
> But Pascal's wager was anchored to specific attested propositions: specifically, the gospel of Jesus
Right, but that's the problem with it. It assumes that there are only two possibilities: no god, or the god of the New Testament.
Betting that Pascal's god exists isn't the safe choice that the wager makes it out to be, because it's equally possible that some other god exists (or just some other version of the Abrahamic god, say Allah or the pre-messiah god of Israel) and your faith in Jesus is just going to piss him off.
Believe in Jesus all you want, but Pascal's Wager is a pretty terrible reason to do so.
Edit to add: Your description is also not even the only possible New Testament god. Some (myself included) would argue that that particular image of god was painted more by Paul than by Jesus.
> It assumes that there are only two possibilities: no god, or the god of the New Testament.
I don't think so. It isn't concerned with giving any description or shape to the negative case, just an invitation to consider a particular positive case.
There are positive cases for other gospels and worldviews... there's nothing wrong with invitations to engage with one or another.
As science has shown, the truth is best discerned by considering each theory individually (and continually) against evidence. Not "dark matter sounds cool, I think that's true, not MOND" but rather considering each individually for internal consistency and against observation and predictiveness.
"It does not make any difference how beautiful your guess is, it does not make any difference how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is — if it disagrees with experiment, it is wrong." --Richard Feynman
Sure, you can consider the issue in isolation: If you accept the axiom that there is either no god or the Pauline Christian god, then Pascal's wager makes sense (assuming that that god doesn't care about sincerity, which is certainly not my reading of the gospels, but that's a different issue).
If you want to do a fun thought experiment, you might accept that axiom.
If you genuinely believe that an eternal future of unbearable torture hinges on your choice, you might want to cover your philosophical bases a bit more thoroughly.
That may be true, but embodied human life and history provides a base set of axioms by which to evaluate further axioms -- starting with the 5 senses.
So yeah, Christianity has some axioms, but it doesn't ask people to merely accept them on faith; that's a mischaracterization. The invitation is to consider (a) how good the evidence really is for your current worldview, and then (b) how good is the evidence for Christianity's truth claims.
Pascal goes one further and suggests considering what you have to gain and lose either way -- which may have been helpful for some when the alternative was mere atheism or unbelief in Christianity, but I disagree that it's helpful in all cases. People coming from Islam have a tremendous amount to lose, including their family, community, livelihood, reputation, and the risk of being condemned eternally by Allah for committing shirk in embracing Christianity, if Islam is true.
I think a better question to ask, whatever someone's background, is "do you want to know the truth, even if it turns out you don't believe it now, and are you willing to follow it no matter what the cost?"
Are you saying the case for Scientology can't fail when considering its internal consistency and correspondence to reality?
I would think its positive case isn't that strong... it's more like an attack chain with an arbitrary payload (including money extraction) for minds with certain vulnerabilities than a coherent set of truth claims (let alone truth claims with at least some evidence in favor).
I'm not sure what you mean by "attested" there, it's doing a lot of work.
Certainly there are specific propositions that someone will or has attested to that a god exists that will punish you for believing in the Christian god.
Sure, if you insist there is more reason to suspect the existence of the Christian god than other gods, then your decision is already made for you; it was not my understanding that Pascal's wager was based on that assumption, but I guess it was implicitly, sure, while explicitly claiming to be based on a clean slate of assumptions. Which makes it even sillier.
Pascal's wager was not at all anchored to any specific attestations, you are taking his wager and reinterpreting it to give it some kind of legitimacy that it never originally held. The entire point of the wager was to justify belief in the absence of sufficient evidence, by appealing to the asymmetry between infinite reward and finite cost. If your now arguing that Christianity is more credible because of historical evidence, so be it and stick to it but you've abandoned Pascal's wager and moved on to an entirely different argument.
> by appealing to the asymmetry between infinite reward and finite cost
The supposed asymmetry only holds in a framework that assumes the Christian God as the only possibility. The point is that it's possible for there to be a god that isn't Yahweh, and that god might sentence you to eternal torment for believing in Yahweh, so in fact believing in Yahweh can result in infinite cost, destroying the value of the wager.
Not at all. The asymmetry holds whenever the other possibilities don't introduce an opposing infinite penalty for belief. There could be countless other gods who are indifferent to Christian belief, reward it, or impose only finite penalties, and the asymmetry would remain intact.
The hypothetical god who punishes believers of a Christian God is a legitimate objection to Pascal's wager, but it doesn't establish the original assertion I objected to. You're confusing demonstrating that the asymmetry isn't guaranteed with demonstrating that it requires Christianity to be the only possibility. Those are two entirely different claims.
>The asymmetry holds whenever the other possibilities don't introduce an opposing infinite penalty for belief.
Or in a stronger argument. It only works when you're the only possible infinity that exists with the set of possible requirements. The moment another infinity exists that has even a single conflicting requirement then it falls apart.
Using language we can create infinite conflicting infinities which makes Pascals wager a weak argument in a generalized set.
Now, if someone vibe coded up Roko's basalisk into a real entity that was copying humans and torturing them for eternity that's a different story, at least until someone made a second incompatible basalisk.
I agree Pascal's wager is generally weak. But I think the strongest reason it's weak is because people in other worldviews, particularly Islam, have a tremendous amount to lose if they convert to Christianity but it turns out Islam is true.
Judaism has, outside some mystical currents, less of an emphasis on "well, do you really believe?" than in Christianity, and more of an emphasis on rule-following (and studying how to navigate those rules) as the basic bargain between God and man.
EDIT: My bad, I missed that Neumann asked to be baptised, so he wasn't going back to the Judaism of his ancestors through his Pascal's Wager-esque step.
True, but I believe Pascal was specifically talking about the Christian god, was he not? Ironically, Jesus clearly claims that what truly matters to god is your intentions, as in the goodness of your heart. I would argue that Paul came along later and dumbed that idea down to "do you really believe?", which is what Pascal based his wager on.
Maybe I'm just weird, but I can't actually choose what I believe. I can choose to go to church and I can choose to say I believe and I can choose to donate money to some religious institution, but I don't think I'm capable of believing something that I think is dumb.
Pascal's Wager if you read the entire book is more intricate than choosing to believe. He also argues that by practicing as if you believed, you may feel as if the choice is true and find God that way.
I see it as more of a rationalization. When you already believe something, you look for intellectual reasons to justify that belief. Pascal's Wager feel like that to me. Its main power is hardening an existing belief rather than swaying an undecided mind.
Except that 'pisteuō' means more nearly "to be faithful to" or, one could even say, to enter a type of contract (thus the Greek construct 'dia pistis', two parties relating "through faithfulness").
Anglo evangelicalism constrained its meaning to something like "intellectual assent", for its own purposes (in my opinion, it made for better sales models) some time in the nineteenth century. And as you essentially point out, intellectual assent is fairly meaningless.
That and it only really works in a system where one decision involves an infinity. Once you add a second infinity that is not aligned or is incompatible with the first it falls apart.
If you're unfamiliar, there is a lot of historical context around Pascal's Wager -
Unless you live in a brutal theocracy, it's difficult to describe just how powerful institutionalized Christianity was at the time. Likewise the scale of religion-themed violence. A couple generations before Pascal's birth (in France), the Catholic-vs.-Protestant https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Wars_of_Religion had kill off something between 10% and 25% of the population of France.
In many ways, I'd interpret the Wager as saying "if professing quiet belief in the current local orthodoxy is relatively cheap, and those not doing so are occasionally slaughtered at scale, then prudent people will parrot orthodoxy".
> Then the last paragraph suggesting he would want to ban AI.
The article doesn't say that, though. Here's the last paragraph quoted in full:
>> And then he names the qualities required: "patience, flexibility, intelligence". So, here is von Neumann, the master of abstraction, with no abstraction to offer. Maybe through his bout of applying minimax reasoning to nuclear strategy, he learned what a formal model is worth when the assumptions are shaky and the stakes are civilizational.
Please point out where in here Murat claims that von Neumann would ban AI?
In fact, the preceding paragraphs (the rest of that section) show that von Neumann would not be in favor of banning AI, or any particular technology. It's an argument for intelligent and deliberate action, not bans. Where he does talk about bans, he talks about their futility.
My apologies, I was skimming initially and, from just the headings it appeared to fit that pattern I've seen everywhere lately.
I agree with you that upon closer reading, this hypothetical JVN isn't arguing for a ban, but you could certainly read
> He goes on to say that a ban would have to be worldwide to work
> What safeguard remains? Apparently only day-to-day — or perhaps year-to-year — opportunistic measures, a long sequence of small, correct decisions. [...]
and
> The only safety possible is relative, and it lies in an intelligent exercise of day-to-day judgment.
as an argument for regulation.
And it does feel like a doomer narrative.
> For progress there is no cure. Any attempt to find automatically safe channels for the present explosive variety of progress must lead to frustration.
Also, while we glorify JVN's intellect, let's not forget that all his reasoning resulted in him publicly arguing for the nuclear annihilation of a vast country of people.
It says you can't ban AI and shouldn't try. There is no general solution except a worldwide ban of technology itself. What you can do is local and incremental and based on good judgement, patience, intelligence, etc.
I always recommend Turing's Cathedral: The Origins of the Digital Universe[0] by George Dyson when John von Neumann comes up, it's a fabulous read.
[0] https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/44425/turings-cathe...
This book is fantastic. Highly recommended if you have any interest in how the stored program computer came to be. The Dyson name apparently led to unrivaled access to first-hand accounts.
The audiobook was fantastic
> Budapest around 1900 produced an absurd cluster of minds: von Neumann, Eugene Wigner, Edward Teller, Leo Szilard, Paul Erdős, Theodore von Kármán, George Pólya.
Not to mention Nikola Tesla about 20 years prior.
> When several of them turned up at Los Alamos and realized they had gone to high school together, Szilard joked that Hungary was a cover story for a Martian landing.
What if there actually are people who go to Mars in the future but regret it and the only way for them to come back to Earth is to invent a time machine and be reborn as a mathematical supergenius. That would explain this at least:
> At six, Janos (the OG hungarian name for Johnny) could divide eight-digit numbers in his head and hold a conversation in ancient Greek. He later added Latin, French, German, English, and Yiddish. The rumor was that he remembered everything he ever read. Many years later Herman Goldstine decided to test this by asking him to recite "A Tale of Two Cities." Von Neumann started on chapter one and had to be asked to stop fifteen minutes later.
ACX has a review on book that goes on exploring this: https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-man-from-th...
Tesla was educated in Graz and was only in Budapest for about a year
> That would explain this at least:
There are more pedestrian explanations. https://www.theintrinsicperspective.com/p/john-von-neumann-s...
Ha! thank you. Doubted these crazy anecdotes. Often we're tempted to repeat them to impress our audience. I know I do..
I once stumbled across a video on the Two Minute Papers YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/@TwoMinutePapers
I remarked to myself how much the speaker sounded like Ren Hoëk, from The Ren and Stimpy Show. Then I looked up the name of the channel host: Károly Zsolnai-Fehér.
I thought to myself: Huh. Hungarian. That explains the mathematical prowess—and the voice. (Ren's voice is a pastiche of Hungarian actor Peter Lorre.)
It's worth keeping in mind in the 1900s the bar for novelty was much lower. Today you'd have to learn vastly more to even stand a chance of making a single contribution , let alone as many as he had done.
That's true at the beginning of a new field. I'm noted for some advances in network architecture. But when I did that, everybody working on the Internet could meet in one large classroom. If you were reasonably good, you could make major progress.
Computer science used to be tiny. In the late 1970s, AI was a few tens of people at MIT, at Stanford, and at CMU, with a few smaller groups elsewhere. I met about half the greats of my generation, as did everyone else who was serious. There were almost no textbooks in the early 1970s. When Knuth's Fundamental Algorithms came out, it was great to finally see what had previously been folklore on mimeographed sheets in an actual book.
I was involved with Autodesk in its very early days. Even went to the founding meeting. The feeling was that PCs were finally getting big enough to be interesting. The founders were all mainframe programmers, and the people who came up from 4K memory on an 8088 had no idea how to organize a big program. But mainframe people did.
There was a vast emptyness in the product space ready to be filled. Products considered were a window manager ("AutoScreen"), a text editor (Kern Sibbald actually built that), a database, and a CAD program. None of those existed yet as successful products. CAD was picked because the productivity gain was so huge vs. paper and pencil drafting. At the time, the state of the art in drawing editing was drawing on mylar and using an electric eraser to delete. Then you ran the Mylar master through a big copier to make blueprints or whiteprints. A CAD system on a PC was a very easy sell.
So all you had to do was make it work. No need to overcome the noise level of a thousand similar "apps".
Today you'd have to be an LLM.
I recently read 'Maniac' by Benjamin Labatut, which also tracks the life of Johnny von Neumann. It is a wonderful read - very eloquently put together, giving accounts of the man from the perspectives of several people in his life.
Not only does it capture the alien-like genius of the protagonist, but also described his particular emotional and social character in a way that I have not seen written elsewhere. Highly recommended.
Seconding this. Maniac is a beautifully written book about von Neumann. It also led me to Benjamin Labatut's When We Cease to Understand the World, another great read.
I looked at the description and this part: "Braiding fact with fiction, Benjamín Labatut takes us on a journey to the frontiers of rational thought" - gave me pause. The Braiding fact with fiction part. Are there clear demarcations between fact and fiction?
I read The man From the Future a few years ago, and I highly recommend it! John von Neumann was such a fascinating and influential character. If you are interested in the modern history of mathematics, computers, game theory and more, pick up a copy.
I also wrote about why I liked the book so much:
https://henrikwarne.com/2024/07/07/john-von-neumann-the-man-...
Any cognitive scientists here, or actual people with eidetic memory, who can comment how the brain would store everything you ever read or heard and how it can be recalled? What does it feel like to be able to recall and recite the entire text of a Tale of Two Cities?
That's sadly impossible, because the brain, as a limited number of cells, cannot store infite data. The problem lies in the people observing them, but you have some fun mechanisms (and a few of the commonly known fallacies and biases) at work here, that can all contribute to that perceived effect/illusion. Consider the following ideas:
- people can be slightly better than a given random observer, because they learned and prioritise to pay attention. They are better at recalling memorable and minor details, especially in short term memory and in memorable situations that a lot of people share long term. They will still forget long term information that is irrelevant.
- any such person and also observer can easily talk themselves into the belief that their skill must be absolute, especially since the observer will largely only test from his own inferior dataset.
- once the belief takes hold (because people love a good story), observers tend to look less for flaws and more for further confirmations to keep mythologising people.
It is debatable how much of his memory feats are true. many of these claims are aphorical.
Aphorical?
apocryphal ?
Guys, guys! Read the article mentioned in the comments, it sheds light on this (and many more) feats that surround him.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50250271
I would imagine that such people stay off opine and commentary style forums because their instant capacity to recall authoritative sources makes wrongful and derivative discussion tedious. To some extent, with the speed of LLM search and recovery today, we might all be heading that way. Indeed, interesting HN traffic of late appears to have waned. No doubt someone will say I'm hallucinating and all's normal. No, I'm not hallucinating.
It ebbs and flows. It’s actually quite fun to watch. When an interesting article pops up, inevitably a series of echos rise to the front page in the form of subjects corresponding to the various Wikipedia links one would need to fully understand a particular article, or sometimes just tangents that come up.
Tangents and tangerine dreams :)
What beautiful writing. I had no idea JVN did so many things..
"Can we survive technology?" got me thinking about our industry's upheaval. Software engineering's receiving the disruption it so proudly inflicted on other industries.. not reaping what it sowed; rather just the natural order of things.
Acceptance and moving with change is all that can work. Obstructing; denying; ignoring progress.. you'll lose your edge, your relevance, your value to others, and your job. Progress won't wait for us to like it. We must move fast enough to survive change.
Junior engineers for example? Suddenly too junior to be hired? Great! They, and you, can access multiple answer boxes with every PhD ever, and with a bit of creativity, they can leverage that. The best will survive on their own - the rest we should help along. Let's create tools and structures and institutions and help junior engineers finish their education to marketable levels. Let's help them find efficiencies and get there in the same duration. We shouldn't compel companies to preserve a hiring pipeline; now should we incrementally upgrade university educations. Better to go to kids in schools & universities and stimulate their creativity, get them using new tools in new ways, finding efficiencies - because that's what today and tomorrow's jobs will be about. Institutions will adopt the good ideas in time.
We have a responsibility to invest in - and invent - ways of bringing people along.
Was not expecting to see some LLM tells in Murat's writing, although it's clearly been heavily hand-edited.
Big fan of VnM theorem, which this article alludes to in passing. I think it asks a really great question: "can we make good decisions under uncertainty?" And the answer turns out to be "Yes" with some caveats.
He advocated an immediate preemptive nuclear strike on the USSR: "If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at five o'clock, I say why not one o'clock?"
This is why he was dismissed in so far as foreign policy was concerned, where nuance and patience takes precedence over cold, calculating game theory. Not only would it not have been feasible (Russia is huge), but it would have led to follow on effects by possibly pulling the US into potentially another world war. This is evidence you can be a genius in some areas and wrong in others.
That quote doesn't sound like advocacy of an immediate strike to me. That "if" is massive, and going into the details of why you're not already attacking is very likely to give you reasons that keep making you not attack.
Maybe there's some context that suggests otherwise?
I suspect some of these anecdotes are false, 15 mins of tale of two cities, 8 digit division in your head?
This gives a sense of embellishment by a clueless layman who think very smart people can memorize every single thing they ever do. Computers memorize well, very smart humans, it’s not clear if they memorize any better than a man of the street. I was struck by a fields medalist recent comment that he sometimes struggle remembering proofs he wrote himself in the past.
Memorizing books is absolutely possible. A great book about it is Moonwalking with Einstein (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moonwalking_with_Einstein), written by a journalist who was a skeptic but ended becoming a competitive mnemonicist himself. Some people intuitively learn the techniques early in life, and for some of them it becomes a habit.
Same thing applies to mental arithmetic. There are techniques for doing this. IIRC, ironically there's a famous case of someone who claimed to have memorized some hundreds of thousands digits of Pi but was suspected of using mental arithmetic techniques when reciting them.
Still, your point stands. People do embellish these kinds of stories based on stereotypes. It's certainly possible, but any particular anecdote may still be suspect.
Actors routinely memorize whole plays, so it is not implausible for someone to have memorized 15 min of A Tale of Two Cities.
The claim in the article is he remembered everything he read perfectly, which is wild. But another source claim he specifically memorized the Dickens book to train his English, which sounds more likely.
I instantly lose respect to any man that "drove crowded roads like a maniac, and got bored and slowed down on open ones. He wrecked a car roughly every year"
I’m going to go out on a limb here and assume there is nobody on your people-I-respect list?
> And most of the world is not zero-sum...
That is a strange thing to say, especially now.
Clearly, there is a reason Von Neumann spent so much time on this 'zero-sum' formulation of the problem, specifically in economics. Clearly he must have believed this was representative to a significant extent, especially given his interest in pragmatic problems.
It would make no sense for an intelligent person to work on an economics problem which doesn't model reality.
> It would make no sense for an intelligent person to work on an economics problem which doesn't model reality.
So Newton was wasting everybody’s time with the gravity malarky after all?!
“All models are wrong, but some are useful.”
> Johnny remained a game theorist to the end. After a lifetime of culturally Jewish atheism, he asked to be baptized. His daughter attributed it to Pascal's Wager: a small probability of a much better afterlife, against a trivial cost.
The house always wins.
I've always thought that surely an all-knowing god would consider Pascal's Wager to be rather mercenary and insincere, and it wouldn't count.
People always leave off the second half of Pascal's Wager. Pascal's Wager is not simply that you can map out the odds vs risk and decide being a theist is more practical. But rather that if you take the odds, decide to be a theist, then start acting like one (participating in rituals, living like one, practicing what is preached, etc) then you may find God through those actions.
A god who didn't like rules lawyering would ruin a lot of people's plans https://www.npr.org/2019/05/13/721551785/a-fishing-line-enci...
Or maybe he'd even penalize you for it.
It's important to recall that an all-knowing God isn't necessarily very compassionate, or even rational. Some of the people I've known who knew the most have been the biggest assholes. Or insane.
What if there's a god, but he punishes humans for believing he exists, just for fun? Where's your wager now?
> What if there's a god, but he punishes humans for believing he exists, just for fun? Where's your wager now?
That's the equivalent of Russell's teapot - an imagined, unfalsifiable proposition.
But Pascal's wager was anchored to specific attested propositions: specifically, the gospel of Jesus (repent of sin and call to him, he's paid for it and will save you from judgment and eternal separation from God if you do) rooted in the historical events of his verbal claim to be the son of God, followed by his death and resurrection, witnessed by many. You may agree or disagree, but what you are affirming or denying is at least concrete and specific.
> But Pascal's wager was anchored to specific attested propositions: specifically, the gospel of Jesus
Right, but that's the problem with it. It assumes that there are only two possibilities: no god, or the god of the New Testament.
Betting that Pascal's god exists isn't the safe choice that the wager makes it out to be, because it's equally possible that some other god exists (or just some other version of the Abrahamic god, say Allah or the pre-messiah god of Israel) and your faith in Jesus is just going to piss him off.
Believe in Jesus all you want, but Pascal's Wager is a pretty terrible reason to do so.
Edit to add: Your description is also not even the only possible New Testament god. Some (myself included) would argue that that particular image of god was painted more by Paul than by Jesus.
> It assumes that there are only two possibilities: no god, or the god of the New Testament.
I don't think so. It isn't concerned with giving any description or shape to the negative case, just an invitation to consider a particular positive case.
There are positive cases for other gospels and worldviews... there's nothing wrong with invitations to engage with one or another.
As science has shown, the truth is best discerned by considering each theory individually (and continually) against evidence. Not "dark matter sounds cool, I think that's true, not MOND" but rather considering each individually for internal consistency and against observation and predictiveness.
"It does not make any difference how beautiful your guess is, it does not make any difference how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is — if it disagrees with experiment, it is wrong." --Richard Feynman
Sure, you can consider the issue in isolation: If you accept the axiom that there is either no god or the Pauline Christian god, then Pascal's wager makes sense (assuming that that god doesn't care about sincerity, which is certainly not my reading of the gospels, but that's a different issue).
If you want to do a fun thought experiment, you might accept that axiom.
If you genuinely believe that an eternal future of unbearable torture hinges on your choice, you might want to cover your philosophical bases a bit more thoroughly.
That may be true, but embodied human life and history provides a base set of axioms by which to evaluate further axioms -- starting with the 5 senses.
So yeah, Christianity has some axioms, but it doesn't ask people to merely accept them on faith; that's a mischaracterization. The invitation is to consider (a) how good the evidence really is for your current worldview, and then (b) how good is the evidence for Christianity's truth claims.
Pascal goes one further and suggests considering what you have to gain and lose either way -- which may have been helpful for some when the alternative was mere atheism or unbelief in Christianity, but I disagree that it's helpful in all cases. People coming from Islam have a tremendous amount to lose, including their family, community, livelihood, reputation, and the risk of being condemned eternally by Allah for committing shirk in embracing Christianity, if Islam is true.
I think a better question to ask, whatever someone's background, is "do you want to know the truth, even if it turns out you don't believe it now, and are you willing to follow it no matter what the cost?"
>just an invitation to consider a particular positive case.
The problem is you can't do this with made up bullshit because the creators of said bullshit can create any number of paradoxes to trap you.
Reality at least has to be self consistent.
> you can't do this with made up bullshit
Are you saying the case for Scientology can't fail when considering its internal consistency and correspondence to reality?
I would think its positive case isn't that strong... it's more like an attack chain with an arbitrary payload (including money extraction) for minds with certain vulnerabilities than a coherent set of truth claims (let alone truth claims with at least some evidence in favor).
I'm not sure what you mean by "attested" there, it's doing a lot of work.
Certainly there are specific propositions that someone will or has attested to that a god exists that will punish you for believing in the Christian god.
Sure, if you insist there is more reason to suspect the existence of the Christian god than other gods, then your decision is already made for you; it was not my understanding that Pascal's wager was based on that assumption, but I guess it was implicitly, sure, while explicitly claiming to be based on a clean slate of assumptions. Which makes it even sillier.
Pascal's wager was not at all anchored to any specific attestations, you are taking his wager and reinterpreting it to give it some kind of legitimacy that it never originally held. The entire point of the wager was to justify belief in the absence of sufficient evidence, by appealing to the asymmetry between infinite reward and finite cost. If your now arguing that Christianity is more credible because of historical evidence, so be it and stick to it but you've abandoned Pascal's wager and moved on to an entirely different argument.
> by appealing to the asymmetry between infinite reward and finite cost
The supposed asymmetry only holds in a framework that assumes the Christian God as the only possibility. The point is that it's possible for there to be a god that isn't Yahweh, and that god might sentence you to eternal torment for believing in Yahweh, so in fact believing in Yahweh can result in infinite cost, destroying the value of the wager.
Not at all. The asymmetry holds whenever the other possibilities don't introduce an opposing infinite penalty for belief. There could be countless other gods who are indifferent to Christian belief, reward it, or impose only finite penalties, and the asymmetry would remain intact.
The hypothetical god who punishes believers of a Christian God is a legitimate objection to Pascal's wager, but it doesn't establish the original assertion I objected to. You're confusing demonstrating that the asymmetry isn't guaranteed with demonstrating that it requires Christianity to be the only possibility. Those are two entirely different claims.
>The asymmetry holds whenever the other possibilities don't introduce an opposing infinite penalty for belief.
Or in a stronger argument. It only works when you're the only possible infinity that exists with the set of possible requirements. The moment another infinity exists that has even a single conflicting requirement then it falls apart.
Using language we can create infinite conflicting infinities which makes Pascals wager a weak argument in a generalized set.
Now, if someone vibe coded up Roko's basalisk into a real entity that was copying humans and torturing them for eternity that's a different story, at least until someone made a second incompatible basalisk.
I agree Pascal's wager is generally weak. But I think the strongest reason it's weak is because people in other worldviews, particularly Islam, have a tremendous amount to lose if they convert to Christianity but it turns out Islam is true.
>but it turns out Islam is true.
I may be misinterpreting this but
Lol, wut.
After the word "if", the entire rest of the sentence is the hypothetical.
I'm just saying from the viewpoint of people in Islam (or in Islamic nations)... the tradeoffs look a lot different from that perspective.
Almost nothing in common with a 17th century French philosopher in Christian Europe
Judaism has, outside some mystical currents, less of an emphasis on "well, do you really believe?" than in Christianity, and more of an emphasis on rule-following (and studying how to navigate those rules) as the basic bargain between God and man.
EDIT: My bad, I missed that Neumann asked to be baptised, so he wasn't going back to the Judaism of his ancestors through his Pascal's Wager-esque step.
True, but I believe Pascal was specifically talking about the Christian god, was he not? Ironically, Jesus clearly claims that what truly matters to god is your intentions, as in the goodness of your heart. I would argue that Paul came along later and dumbed that idea down to "do you really believe?", which is what Pascal based his wager on.
I never really understood Pascal's Wager.
Maybe I'm just weird, but I can't actually choose what I believe. I can choose to go to church and I can choose to say I believe and I can choose to donate money to some religious institution, but I don't think I'm capable of believing something that I think is dumb.
Pascal's Wager if you read the entire book is more intricate than choosing to believe. He also argues that by practicing as if you believed, you may feel as if the choice is true and find God that way.
I see it as more of a rationalization. When you already believe something, you look for intellectual reasons to justify that belief. Pascal's Wager feel like that to me. Its main power is hardening an existing belief rather than swaying an undecided mind.
Except that 'pisteuō' means more nearly "to be faithful to" or, one could even say, to enter a type of contract (thus the Greek construct 'dia pistis', two parties relating "through faithfulness").
Anglo evangelicalism constrained its meaning to something like "intellectual assent", for its own purposes (in my opinion, it made for better sales models) some time in the nineteenth century. And as you essentially point out, intellectual assent is fairly meaningless.
Yeah, this is one of the more subtle issues with Pascal's wager.
That and it only really works in a system where one decision involves an infinity. Once you add a second infinity that is not aligned or is incompatible with the first it falls apart.
If you're unfamiliar, there is a lot of historical context around Pascal's Wager -
Unless you live in a brutal theocracy, it's difficult to describe just how powerful institutionalized Christianity was at the time. Likewise the scale of religion-themed violence. A couple generations before Pascal's birth (in France), the Catholic-vs.-Protestant https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Wars_of_Religion had kill off something between 10% and 25% of the population of France.
Pascal's own religious beliefs changed several times - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blaise_Pascal#Religious_conver...
The Wager was published after Pascal's death, in an edited collection of his notes - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pens%C3%A9es
In many ways, I'd interpret the Wager as saying "if professing quiet belief in the current local orthodoxy is relatively cheap, and those not doing so are occasionally slaughtered at scale, then prudent people will parrot orthodoxy".
In the immortal words of Achewood's Cornelius T. Bear:
that's my man
[dead]
Article spends the first 95% establishing JVN as a mythologically intelligent person. Then the last paragraph suggesting he would want to ban AI.
So much content out there atm nudging very hard for AI regulation.
> Then the last paragraph suggesting he would want to ban AI.
The article doesn't say that, though. Here's the last paragraph quoted in full:
>> And then he names the qualities required: "patience, flexibility, intelligence". So, here is von Neumann, the master of abstraction, with no abstraction to offer. Maybe through his bout of applying minimax reasoning to nuclear strategy, he learned what a formal model is worth when the assumptions are shaky and the stakes are civilizational.
Please point out where in here Murat claims that von Neumann would ban AI?
In fact, the preceding paragraphs (the rest of that section) show that von Neumann would not be in favor of banning AI, or any particular technology. It's an argument for intelligent and deliberate action, not bans. Where he does talk about bans, he talks about their futility.
My apologies, I was skimming initially and, from just the headings it appeared to fit that pattern I've seen everywhere lately.
I agree with you that upon closer reading, this hypothetical JVN isn't arguing for a ban, but you could certainly read
> He goes on to say that a ban would have to be worldwide to work
> What safeguard remains? Apparently only day-to-day — or perhaps year-to-year — opportunistic measures, a long sequence of small, correct decisions. [...]
and
> The only safety possible is relative, and it lies in an intelligent exercise of day-to-day judgment.
as an argument for regulation.
And it does feel like a doomer narrative.
> For progress there is no cure. Any attempt to find automatically safe channels for the present explosive variety of progress must lead to frustration.
Also, while we glorify JVN's intellect, let's not forget that all his reasoning resulted in him publicly arguing for the nuclear annihilation of a vast country of people.
It says you can't ban AI and shouldn't try. There is no general solution except a worldwide ban of technology itself. What you can do is local and incremental and based on good judgement, patience, intelligence, etc.
[comment withdrawn]
> This is an invented quote...
It's not an invented quote, here's an Archive copy of the source:
https://archive.org/details/ETC3234/page/669/mode/2up
ok. I withdrew my comment.
Where does it say (or suggest) that they would ban AI? Perhaps I'm reading it wrong, but I think you missed the point.